CVE-2026-10641
HighCVSS 7.1Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk7th percentile — higher than 7% of all known CVEs
Summary
In the Bluetooth Classic Hands-Free Profile (HFP) implementation in Zephyr OS, an out-of-bounds write vulnerability was found. During processing of AT+CIND: response from an Audio Gateway (AG) device, the cind_handle_values() function writes data to the ind_table[] array without verifying that the index does not exceed its size (20 elements). A remote, malicious or compromised Bluetooth peer can send a response with more than 20 entries, causing a write beyond the array and memory corruption.
Risk Assessment
An attacker can cause memory corruption of the connection structure, resulting in at least a denial of service (DoS) of the Bluetooth stack. The attack requires no user interaction – a single malformed AT response is sufficient.
Recommendation
Update Zephyr OS to a version containing the fix (commit adding the guard index = ARRAY_SIZE(hf-ind_table)). For systems that cannot be updated, it is recommended to disable the CONFIG_BT_HFP_HF option if not required.
Original NVD description (English source)
Zephyr's Bluetooth Classic Hands-Free Profile (HFP) Hands-Free role parser (subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/hfp_hf.c) contains an out-of-bounds write. During Service Level Connection setup the HF sends AT+CIND=? and parses the AG's +CIND: response in cind_handle(), which assigns a per-entry counter index and calls cind_handle_values() for each list element. cind_handle_values() then wrote hf-ind_table[index] = i without verifying that index is within the 20-element int8_t ind_table[] array of struct bt_hfp_hf. Because the parser places no cap on the number of +CIND: list entries, a remote Attendant Gateway (a malicious, compromised, or spoofed peer the device connects to over Bluetooth) can send a response with more than 20 recognized indicator entries and drive index arbitrarily large, writing a small attacker-positioned value past the array into adjacent struct fields (feature masks, SDP/version state, the calls[] array, work/atomic bookkeeping) and potentially beyond the static connection pool slot. This yields memory corruption and at least denial of service of the Bluetooth host, triggered by a single malformed AT response with no user interaction. The sibling consumer ag_indicator_handle_values() already performed the equivalent bounds check; this commit adds the same index = ARRAY_SIZE(hf-ind_table) guard to close the gap. Affects builds with CONFIG_BT_HFP_HF enabled; introduced with the original HFP HF CIND parser (~v1.7) and present through v4.4.0.