CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-13735

LowCVSS 3.7
Published: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.25%

16th percentile - higher than 16% of all known CVEs

Summary

Zephyr's WireGuard implementation mishandled keepalive packets. A type-4 message with a 16-byte payload (empty plaintext plus Poly1305 tag) was accepted without tag verification because wg_process_data_message() returned early before calling wg_decrypt_packet(). An attacker could send a forged keepalive without knowing the session key.

Risk Assessment

The risk is the ability to spoof the NET_EVENT_VPN_CONNECTED signal in the management layer, potentially misleading monitoring systems or automation reacting to VPN events. There is no impact on confidentiality, data integrity, or availability, but the integrity of the connection status is compromised.

Recommendation

Apply the fix provided by the Zephyr project, which removes the pre-decrypt early return and enforces Poly1305 tag verification plus anti-replay checks. Update to a patched version.

Other vulnerabilities in Zephyr

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

Zephyr's WireGuard implementation in subsys/net/lib/wireguard/wg_crypto.c mishandled keepalive packets. In wg_process_data_message(), any type-4 transport-data message whose payload was exactly 16 bytes (an empty plaintext plus a bare Poly1305 tag, i.e. a keepalive) was accepted and returned immediately, before wg_decrypt_packet() was ever called. The Poly1305 authentication tag was therefore never verified; the only preceding gates were a cleartext receiver-index lookup (get_peer_keypair_for_index() on the attacker-supplied data_hdr->receiver) and a non-cryptographic keypair validity/expiry check. The path is reachable entirely from the network: inbound UDP on the WireGuard port is dispatched by wg_input() to handle_transport_data() and then wg_process_data_message(). The 32-bit receiver index is transmitted in cleartext in WireGuard handshake and data messages, so an on-path observer learns it directly and an off-path attacker can brute-force it against the UDP port. Given an active receiving-valid session for that index, an attacker could send a 16-byte garbage payload and have it accepted without possessing the session key. On acceptance the unauthenticated message caused the management layer to observe a spoofed NET_EVENT_VPN_CONNECTED signal (setting peer->first_valid and notifying any net_mgmt listener) and incremented the keepalive-RX statistic. The impact is limited to integrity of this status signal: no plaintext is decrypted or injected, no key is disclosed, and the early-return path did not update the peer endpoint or liveness timers, so there is no traffic-injection, session-takeover, or availability consequence. The fix removes the pre-decrypt early return so a 16-byte payload flows through wg_decrypt_packet(), which verifies the Poly1305 tag over the empty plaintext, followed by the existing anti-replay check; only an authenticated, non-replayed message is then recognised as a keepalive. Forged keepalives now fail the tag check and are counted as decrypt failures.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS