CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-12632

MediumCVSS 6.5
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.25%

16th percentile - higher than 16% of all known CVEs

Summary

A vulnerability in Zephyr RTOS's PTP receive handler allows a remote attacker to trigger an out-of-bounds read by sending a crafted PTP packet with an invalid message type (0xE or 0xF). The lack of an upper-bound check on the msg_size[] array index leads to reading beyond the array and subsequent memory operations, potentially causing a crash or limited memory corruption.

Risk Assessment

An attacker on the same link (via UDP multicast or raw Ethernet) can cause a denial of service (crash) on a device with CONFIG_PTP enabled, with no preconditions. Under certain conditions, limited memory corruption may also occur, leading to unpredictable system behavior.

Recommendation

Update Zephyr RTOS to a patched version that rejects message types >= ARRAY_SIZE(msg_size) with -EBADMSG. If updating is not possible, disable PTP support (CONFIG_PTP) or restrict network access to untrusted hosts.

Other vulnerabilities in Zephyr

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

Zephyr's Precision Time Protocol receive handler ptp_msg_post_recv() in subsys/net/lib/ptp/msg.c takes the 4-bit message type straight off the wire via ptp_msg_type() (msg->header.type_major_sdo_id & 0xF, range 0-15) and uses it to index the msg_size[] table. That table only defines entries up to PTP_MSG_MANAGEMENT (0xD), giving it ARRAY_SIZE == 14. Before the fix there was no upper-bound check, so the undefined types 0xE and 0xF indexed one or two int slots past the end of the array — an out-of-bounds read of adjacent read-only data. The out-of-bounds value is then reused as a length: it gates msg_size[type] > cnt, and when it is small or negative it makes cnt - msg_size[type] a large positive budget passed to msg_tlv_post_recv(), whose TLV loop then walks the message suffix past the received bytes, performing further out-of-bounds reads and in-place byte-swap writes on memory beyond the message slab. The defect is reached directly from the network: ptp_port_event_gen() in subsys/net/lib/ptp/port.c reads a PTP frame with ptp_transport_recv() and calls ptp_msg_post_recv() with the attacker-chosen type. PTP uses UDP multicast or raw Ethernet (0x88F7) and is unauthenticated, so any host on the same link can trigger the indexing on a CONFIG_PTP-enabled node with no preconditions. The reliably reproducible impact is a denial of service (fault/crash); a limited memory-corruption path exists but depends on the build-specific value adjacent to msg_size[], which the attacker cannot tune. The fix rejects type >= ARRAY_SIZE(msg_size) with -EBADMSG before any indexing.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS