CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-13734

MediumCVSS 6.5
Published: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.25%

16th percentile - higher than 16% of all known CVEs

Summary

Vulnerability in Zephyr's WireGuard VPN: wg_process_data_message() validated the anti-replay counter too late, after committing peer-state changes (address update, timers, key rotation). An attacker can re-inject a captured packet, leading to endpoint hijacking and session disruption.

Risk Assessment

Risk includes redirecting tunnel traffic to an attacker-chosen address (roaming hijack) and prematurely destroying the previous session key, causing VPN outages. The attack requires no credentials and can be performed by a network observer.

Recommendation

Apply the fix that moves wg_check_replay() immediately after successful decryption, before any peer-state mutation. Update to a Zephyr version containing this patch.

Other vulnerabilities in Zephyr

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

Zephyr's WireGuard VPN data-plane receive handler wg_process_data_message() in subsys/net/lib/wireguard/wg_crypto.c validated the anti-replay counter too late. After AEAD decryption of a MESSAGE_TRANSPORT_DATA packet succeeded, the code committed several peer-state changes — update_peer_addr() (endpoint roaming update), the keypair->last_rx/peer->last_rx liveness timers, and keypair_update() (promote next→current and destroy the previous keypair) — and only afterward called wg_check_replay(). On a replayed packet the replay check returned -EINVAL, but none of the preceding mutations were rolled back. The AEAD tag authenticates content but not freshness, so a replayed-but-authentic transport packet decrypts correctly. An attacker who captures one valid ciphertext off the wire (an on-path or shared-medium observer) can re-inject it from an arbitrary spoofed source address. Reaching the handler requires no credentials: it is driven directly from inbound UDP datagrams via the dispatch in subsys/net/lib/wireguard/wg.c. Because the state mutations committed before the replay check, the replay repoints the peer endpoint to the attacker-chosen source address (roaming hijack), redirecting the victim's subsequent outbound tunnel traffic until the legitimate peer's next packet re-corrects it; it also prematurely destroys the previous keypair and refreshes the RX liveness timer. The tunnel payload stays encrypted under the session keypair, so this is an integrity/availability impact (traffic redirection and session disruption), not payload disclosure. The fix moves wg_check_replay() to immediately after a successful decrypt, before any peer-state mutation, matching the WireGuard specification and the Linux reference implementation.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS