CVE-2026-64456

WysokieCVSS 7.7

Opublikowano: 25/07/2026(UTC)Zaktualizowano: 17/08/2026(UTC)Przetłumaczono: 25/07/2026(UTC)NVD NIST

Prawdopodobieństwo exploitacji (EPSS)

Niskie ryzyko

0.15%

Percentyl 5 - wyżej niż 5% wszystkich znanych CVE

Streszczenie

W sterowniku hwrng virtio w jądrze Linux wykryto podatność na odczyt poza zakresem bufora. Złośliwe lub uszkodzone urządzenie zaplecza virtio-rng może zgłosić zawyżoną wartość used.len, co prowadzi do memcpy() poza tablicę vi->data do sąsiednich danych sterty.

Ocena ryzyka

Podatność umożliwia wyciek danych z jądra gościa (np. zawartości sterty) do przestrzeni użytkownika przez /dev/hwrng, a także zanieczyszczenie generatora liczb losowych gościa. W modelu confidential-compute może być wykorzystana jako kanał wycieku danych.

Rekomendacja

Należy natychmiast zastosować łatkę jądra Linux zawierającą clamp na used.len w copy_data() oraz array_index_nospec(). Zaleca się aktualizację do wersji jądra zawierającej to zabezpieczenie.

Inne podatności w Linux kernel

Zobacz wszystkie

Oryginalny opis (angielski, źródło NVD)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwrng: virtio: clamp device-reported used.len at copy_data() random_recv_done() stores the device-reported used.len directly into vi->data_avail. copy_data() then indexes vi->data[] using vi->data_idx (advanced by previous copy_data() calls) and issues a memcpy() without re-validating either value against the posted buffer size sizeof(vi->data) (SMP_CACHE_BYTES bytes, typically 32 or 64). A malicious or buggy virtio-rng backend can set used.len beyond sizeof(vi->data), steering the memcpy() past the end of the inline array into adjacent kmalloc-1k slab bytes. hwrng_fillfn() mixes those bytes into the guest RNG, and guest root can also observe them directly via /dev/hwrng. Concrete impact is inside the guest: - Memory-safety / hardening: any virtio-rng backend that over-reports used.len causes the driver to read past vi->data into unrelated slab contents. hwrng_fillfn() is a kernel thread that runs as soon as the device is probed; no guest userspace interaction is required to first-trigger the OOB. - Cross-boundary leak (confidential-compute threat model): a malicious hypervisor cooperating with a malicious or compromised guest root userspace can use /dev/hwrng as a leak channel for guest-kernel heap data. The host sets a large used.len, guest root reads /dev/hwrng, and the returned bytes contain guest kernel slab contents that were adjacent to vi->data. In practice, confidential-compute guests (SEV-SNP, TDX) usually disable virtio-rng entirely, so this path is narrow, but the fix is still worth carrying because the underlying memory-safety bug contaminates the guest RNG on any host. KASAN confirms the OOB on a 7.1-rc4 guest whose virtio-rng backend has been patched to report used.len = 0x10000: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in virtio_read+0x394/0x5d0 Read of size 64 at addr ffff88800ae0ba20 by task hwrng/52 Call Trace: __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 virtio_read+0x394/0x5d0 hwrng_fillfn+0xb2/0x470 kthread+0x2cc/0x3a0 Allocated by task 1: probe_common+0xa5/0x660 virtio_dev_probe+0x549/0xbc0 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800ae0b800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 544-byte region [ffff88800ae0b800, ffff88800ae0ba20) Same class of bug as commit c04db81cd028 ("net/9p: Fix buffer overflow in USB transport layer"), which hardened usb9pfs_rx_complete() against unchecked device-reported length in the USB 9p transport. With the clamp at point of use and array_index_nospec() in place, the same harness boots cleanly: copy_data() returns zero for the bogus report, the device-supplied bytes after data_idx are discarded, and the driver issues a fresh request.