CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-87043

MediumCVSS 4.8
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.18%

8th percentile - higher than 8% of all known CVEs

Summary

In the entropy-device random number generator (subsys/random/random_entropy_device.c), rand_get() returned early with -ENODEV when device_is_ready() failed, bypassing the non-cryptographic system-timer fallback. Because sys_rand_get() and sys_rand32_get() return void and cannot report failure, the caller's output buffer was left untouched and its previous (uninitialized) contents were returned as random data. The not-ready state is a normal runtime condition (e.g., early initialization) or a permanent result of an entropy driver init failure.

Risk Assessment

Every non-cryptographic random value in the system becomes constant or stale memory, leading to predictable CoAP tokens, incorrect TCP initial sequence numbers, DHCP transaction IDs, WebSocket masking keys, RTP SSRCs, and Pointer Authentication keys. Where bytes are transmitted directly (SSH padding, netmidi2 session nonce, DTLS connection ID), stale stack or heap contents may be disclosed on the wire.

Recommendation

Update to a version containing the fix that initializes ret to -ENODEV and only calls entropy_get_entropy() when the device is ready, ensuring the buffer is always written and the timer fallback is used. An attacker cannot induce the unready state, but the resulting non-random values can be exploited remotely, so patching is high priority.

Other vulnerabilities in Zephyr RTOS

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Original NVD description (English source)

The entropy-device random number generator in subsys/random/random_entropy_device.c returned early with -ENODEV from rand_get() as soon as device_is_ready() failed, before reaching the non-cryptographic system-timer fallback further down the same function. Because z_impl_sys_rand_get() returns void and discards that error — and the public sys_rand_get() syscall is itself declared void, so it cannot report failure — the caller's output buffer was left untouched and its previous contents were handed back as random data. The thin wrappers make this a plain uninitialized read: sys_rand32_get() declares uint32_t ret;, calls sys_rand_get(&ret, sizeof(ret)) and returns ret. The "not ready" state is a normal runtime condition rather than a fault. Entropy drivers initialise at PRE_KERNEL_1 with CONFIG_ENTROPY_INIT_PRIORITY (default 50), so any earlier initialiser — kernel objects run at priority 30 — observes an unready device; the sibling generator subsys/random/random_xoshiro128.c and z_early_rand_get() in kernel/init.c both already carried an explicit timer fallback for exactly this case. The state is also permanent for the boot when an entropy driver's init hook fails, which several in-tree drivers can do on real hardware (entropy_stm32 on an RNG clock configuration error, entropy_psa_crypto when psa_crypto_init() fails, entropy_nrf_cracen, entropy_esp32, entropy_virtio). When this occurs, every non-cryptographic random value in the system is either a constant or stale memory. coap_next_token() in subsys/net/lib/coap/coap.c fills a static buffer, so every CoAP token becomes the same .bss constant; tcp_init_isn() in subsys/net/ip/tcp.c returns an uninitialized stack word as the TCP initial sequence number; DHCPv4/DHCPv6 transaction IDs, WebSocket masking keys and RTP SSRCs are similarly degraded, and arch/arm64/core/pac.c derives per-thread Pointer Authentication keys from the same source. Where the bytes are transmitted directly — SSH packet padding, the netmidi2 session nonce, a DTLS connection ID on builds without CONFIG_CSPRNG_ENABLED — stale caller stack or heap contents are disclosed on the wire. The fix initialises ret to -ENODEV and only calls entropy_get_entropy() when the device is ready, so the not-ready case now falls through to the timer fallback and the buffer is always written. The cryptographically secure path is unchanged: sys_csrand_get() still propagates the error to the caller and never silently degrades. An attacker cannot induce the unready state, but can observe and exploit the resulting non-random values remotely on an affected device.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS