CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-87041

HighCVSS 7.8
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.11%

2th percentile - higher than 2% of all known CVEs

Summary

A vulnerability in the RTIO submission-queue verifier rtio_vrfy_sqe() in Zephyr RTOS stems from incorrectly combining K_SYSCALL_MEMORY() results with &=; since the macro returns nonzero on failure, buffer permission checks were inverted. Inaccessible buffers were accepted while legitimate thread-owned buffers caused a kernel oops. This allows user threads with an RTIO context to write to arbitrary kernel memory, disclose it, or fault the kernel, bypassing CONFIG_USERSPACE isolation.

Risk Assessment

A local user or malicious user-mode thread can achieve arbitrary kernel memory write, kernel memory disclosure, or kernel crash, fully escaping the CONFIG_USERSPACE isolation boundary. Any image built with CONFIG_USERSPACE and RTIO userspace support is affected.

Recommendation

Update Zephyr RTOS to a version containing the fix (v4.3.0 or later), which negates K_SYSCALL_MEMORY() results and additionally validates the TXRX transmit buffer as read-only. Until patched, restrict granting RTIO contexts to untrusted user-mode threads.

Other vulnerabilities in Zephyr RTOS

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

The RTIO submission-queue verifier rtio_vrfy_sqe() in subsys/rtio/rtio_syscalls.c (subsys/rtio/rtio_handlers.c before v4.3.0) accumulated the results of K_SYSCALL_MEMORY() into its valid_sqe flag with &=. That macro returns nonzero on failure (it is built on K_SYSCALL_VERIFY_MSG(), which yields !(expr)), so every buffer permission check contributed the opposite of its result. A submission whose tx.buf, rx.buf or txrx.tx_buf/txrx.rx_buf pointer was not accessible to the calling thread was accepted, while a legitimate, thread-owned buffer caused the calling thread to be killed with a kernel oops. The verifier runs on behalf of the rtio_sqe_copy_in_get_handles() system call (also reached through the inline rtio_sqe_copy_in() wrapper), so it is driven directly by untrusted user-mode input on any image built with CONFIG_USERSPACE. A user thread that has been granted an RTIO context and an rtio_iodev object — the intended usage of RTIO userspace support, established via rtio_access_grant() — can submit an SQE whose buffer pointer and length name arbitrary kernel memory; the object check on sqe->iodev is unaffected and still passes, and the crafted SQE is forwarded to the bus driver unchanged. Downstream consumers dereference the pointer with supervisor privilege. The generic I2C and I3C RTIO fallback handlers (drivers/i2c/i2c_rtio_default.c, drivers/i3c/i3c_rtio_default.c) copy sqe.rx.buf/sqe.tx.buf into struct i2c_msg and call i2c_transfer(), and the vendor SPI/I2C RTIO drivers behave equivalently. An RTIO_OP_RX submission therefore has peripheral data written into kernel memory of the attacker's choosing (arbitrary kernel write), an RTIO_OP_TX submission clocks kernel memory out over the bus (kernel memory disclosure), and a pointer to unmapped memory faults the kernel. This is a full escape from the user-mode isolation boundary that CONFIG_USERSPACE exists to enforce. The defect was masked for years because the in-tree user-mode RTIO tests only exercise RTIO_OP_NOP and mempool-backed reads, neither of which reaches the affected checks. The fix negates each K_SYSCALL_MEMORY() result and additionally validates the TXRX transmit buffer read-only, matching the SPI, I2C and I3C handlers.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS