CVE-2026-45560
MediumCVSS 6.1Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk9th percentile - higher than 9% of all known CVEs
Summary
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the wrap_line and highlight_word functions generate raw HTML without proper escaping, allowing for malicious code injection into access logs.
Risk Assessment
An individual who can write a line into the HAProxy/Nginx access logs can inject a malicious payload that executes when a Roxy-WI admin opens the log viewer. This poses an XSS attack risk.
Recommendation
It is recommended to update Roxy-WI to the latest version as soon as patches become available. Access to logs should also be restricted to trusted users.
Other vulnerabilities in Roxy-WI
See all- CVE-2026-45558Critical
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the HAProxy section-save endpoints accept an unvalidated JSON option field, allowing arbitrary HAProxy directives to be injected into the configuration.
- CVE-2026-45556Critical
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the config_file_name field in the POST request /waf/<service>/<server_ip>/rule/<rule_id>/save is not properly validated, allowing an attacker to write files to any location on the load balancer's filesystem.
- CVE-2026-45552Critical
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the lack of proper decorators in certain endpoints allows any logged-in user, including the default guest role, to install and reconfigure exporters, WAF, and GeoIP databases on all servers in the Roxy-WI database.
- CVE-2026-45550Critical
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the PUT /smon/check functionality does not verify if the check_id belongs to the user's group, allowing unauthorized modifications to other users' monitoring settings.
- CVE-2026-45569High
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, there is a vulnerability that allows bypassing security checks related to path validation, potentially leading to path traversal attacks.
- CVE-2026-45567High
Roxy-WI, a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers, has an authentication bypass vulnerability in versions 8.2.6.4 and prior. This vulnerability allows bypassing authentication via the 'api' substring in the URL and accessing the unauthenticated /api/gpt.
- CVE-2026-45566Medium
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the login flow improperly handles URLs, allowing for an open redirect attack.
- CVE-2026-45565High
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the central Pydantic validator does not properly block metacharacters, allowing an attacker to inject unauthorized commands.
- CVE-2026-45564High
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the configver parameter in the URL path is interpolated without proper validation, leading to command injection vulnerabilities for authenticated users.
- CVE-2026-45563Medium
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the server_ip path parameter in GET /history/<service>/<server_ip> is reused as a user-id when service == 'user', with no authorization check.
Original NVD description (English source)
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, wrap_line (app/modules/common/common.py:181-186) and highlight_word (app/modules/common/common.py:188-192) build raw HTML by string concatenation with no escaping. The frontend (app/static/js/script.js, log-viewer paths) uses .html(data) / .append(data) to inject the response body. Anyone able to write a line into a managed HAProxy/Nginx access log (i.e. anyone who can send an HTTP request to the public LB) can land an <svg/onload=…> payload that executes when a Roxy-WI admin opens the log viewer. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.