CVE-2026-45556
CriticalCVSS 9.9Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk23th percentile - higher than 23% of all known CVEs
Summary
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the config_file_name field in the POST request /waf/<service>/<server_ip>/rule/<rule_id>/save is not properly validated, allowing an attacker to write files to any location on the load balancer's filesystem.
Risk Assessment
An attacker can inject malicious code into the crontab, resulting in remote code execution (RCE) with root privileges on every load balancer managed by the attacker's group. This poses a significant security threat to the infrastructure.
Recommendation
It is recommended to update Roxy-WI to the latest version that includes security patches. Additionally, implement further validation mechanisms and access restrictions to critical system paths.
Other vulnerabilities in Roxy-WI
See all- CVE-2026-45558Critical
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the HAProxy section-save endpoints accept an unvalidated JSON option field, allowing arbitrary HAProxy directives to be injected into the configuration.
- CVE-2026-45552Critical
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the lack of proper decorators in certain endpoints allows any logged-in user, including the default guest role, to install and reconfigure exporters, WAF, and GeoIP databases on all servers in the Roxy-WI database.
- CVE-2026-45550Critical
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the PUT /smon/check functionality does not verify if the check_id belongs to the user's group, allowing unauthorized modifications to other users' monitoring settings.
- CVE-2026-45569High
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, there is a vulnerability that allows bypassing security checks related to path validation, potentially leading to path traversal attacks.
- CVE-2026-45567High
Roxy-WI, a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers, has an authentication bypass vulnerability in versions 8.2.6.4 and prior. This vulnerability allows bypassing authentication via the 'api' substring in the URL and accessing the unauthenticated /api/gpt.
- CVE-2026-45566Medium
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the login flow improperly handles URLs, allowing for an open redirect attack.
- CVE-2026-45565High
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the central Pydantic validator does not properly block metacharacters, allowing an attacker to inject unauthorized commands.
- CVE-2026-45564High
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the configver parameter in the URL path is interpolated without proper validation, leading to command injection vulnerabilities for authenticated users.
- CVE-2026-45563Medium
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the server_ip path parameter in GET /history/<service>/<server_ip> is reused as a user-id when service == 'user', with no authorization check.
- CVE-2026-45561Medium
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the /smon/agent/{version,uptime,status,checks}/<server_ip> family of routes takes the URL path component verbatim, which may lead to unauthorized access.
Original NVD description (English source)
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, POST /waf/<service>/<server_ip>/rule/<rule_id>/save accepts a config_file_name form field that is passed straight through to config_mod.master_slave_upload_and_restart(...) as the destination path. The validation chain (_replace_config_path_to_correct → check_is_conf) only requires the path to contain a hard-coded service substring (nginx/haproxy/apache2/httpd/keepalived) and the substring conf or cfg, and to not contain ... The encoded-slash substitution 92 → / is applied before the substring check, so the attacker can build any absolute path anywhere on the LB filesystem as long as it satisfies those substring constraints. The body of the WAF rule (config form field) is written verbatim to that path. By choosing a filename like 92etc92cron.d92nginx_cfg_evil (resolving to /etc/cron.d/nginx_cfg_evil), an attacker drops a cron entry on the load balancer with attacker-controlled content. Cron parses the file on its next scan, executing the embedded job as root — full RCE on every load balancer the caller's group manages. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.
Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS