CVE-2026-45550
CriticalCVSS 9.1Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk10th percentile - higher than 10% of all known CVEs
Summary
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the PUT /smon/check functionality does not verify if the check_id belongs to the user's group, allowing unauthorized modifications to other users' monitoring settings.
Risk Assessment
Any authenticated user can alter the HTTP, TCP, Ping, and DNS monitoring settings of other users, leading to potential security breaches and data loss.
Recommendation
It is recommended to update to the latest version of Roxy-WI when patches become available and to implement additional filters in the update functions to restrict data access to the appropriate user groups.
Other vulnerabilities in Roxy-WI
See all- CVE-2026-45558Critical
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the HAProxy section-save endpoints accept an unvalidated JSON option field, allowing arbitrary HAProxy directives to be injected into the configuration.
- CVE-2026-45556Critical
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the config_file_name field in the POST request /waf/<service>/<server_ip>/rule/<rule_id>/save is not properly validated, allowing an attacker to write files to any location on the load balancer's filesystem.
- CVE-2026-45552Critical
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the lack of proper decorators in certain endpoints allows any logged-in user, including the default guest role, to install and reconfigure exporters, WAF, and GeoIP databases on all servers in the Roxy-WI database.
- CVE-2026-45569High
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, there is a vulnerability that allows bypassing security checks related to path validation, potentially leading to path traversal attacks.
- CVE-2026-45567High
Roxy-WI, a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers, has an authentication bypass vulnerability in versions 8.2.6.4 and prior. This vulnerability allows bypassing authentication via the 'api' substring in the URL and accessing the unauthenticated /api/gpt.
- CVE-2026-45566Medium
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the login flow improperly handles URLs, allowing for an open redirect attack.
- CVE-2026-45565High
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the central Pydantic validator does not properly block metacharacters, allowing an attacker to inject unauthorized commands.
- CVE-2026-45564High
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the configver parameter in the URL path is interpolated without proper validation, leading to command injection vulnerabilities for authenticated users.
- CVE-2026-45563Medium
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the server_ip path parameter in GET /history/<service>/<server_ip> is reused as a user-id when service == 'user', with no authorization check.
- CVE-2026-45561Medium
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the /smon/agent/{version,uptime,status,checks}/<server_ip> family of routes takes the URL path component verbatim, which may lead to unauthorized access.
Original NVD description (English source)
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, PUT /smon/check (app/routes/smon/routes.py:117-138) gates only on roxywi_common.check_user_group_for_flask() — which validates that the caller has some group, not that the target check_id belongs to it. The downstream SQL update functions update_smon, update_smonHttp, update_smonTcp, update_smonPing, update_smonDns (app/modules/db/smon.py:515-562) all execute WHERE smon_id = ? with no user_group filter. The DELETE path is correctly filtered (app/modules/db/smon.py:319-327 does WHERE id = ? AND user_group = ?), demonstrating that the maintainers know the right pattern but did not apply it on UPDATE. Therefore any authenticated user can iterate over smon_id values and silently rewrite any other tenant's HTTP / TCP / Ping / DNS monitoring check. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.
Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS