CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-17508

MediumCVSS 5.3
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.44%

36th percentile - higher than 36% of all known CVEs

Summary

In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, several password-based key derivation entry points ran the KDF with cost parameters taken from the untrusted input being processed, without bounding them, so a small input could dictate an arbitrary amount of work before any password or integrity check could reject it. The affected paths are the RFC 9579 PBMAC1 MAC calculator builders, the scrypt parallelization parameter p in the PKCS#8 and PKCS#12 cost guards, the raw JCA PBKDF2 provider, and the bcrypt round count read from an encrypted OpenSSH v1 private key's own kdfoptions. Each now bounds the parameter before deriving, in line with the caps already applied elsewhere in the tree, with the OpenSSH round count configurable through the new org.bouncycastle.openssh.max_rounds property. This completes the bounding begun in 1.85 for the PKCS#8 / PBES2 decryptors (CVE-2026-15055). This issue also affects Bouncy Castle for Java LTS before 2.73.13, and Bouncy Castle for Java FIPS (BC-FJA) before bcpkix-fips 1.0.13 (1.0.X series), 2.0.13 (2.0.X series) and 2.1.13 (2.1.X series).

Risk Assessment

The organization may be exposed to a DoS attack where an unauthenticated user can send specially crafted data (e.g., PKCS#12 files, OpenSSH keys) causing excessive CPU or memory usage, potentially leading to service unavailability. Additionally, for scrypt, the memory limit can be completely bypassed, increasing the risk of resource exhaustion.

Recommendation

Immediately update Bouncy Castle to version 1.86 or later (for LTS to 2.73.13+, for FIPS to the respective versions 1.0.13+, 2.0.13+, 2.1.13+). If an update is not possible, restrict access to processing untrusted data and consider setting the org.bouncycastle.openssh.max_rounds property to a safe value.

Other vulnerabilities in Bouncy Castle

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, several password-based key derivation entry points ran the KDF with cost parameters taken from the untrusted input being processed, without bounding them, so a small input could dictate an arbitrary amount of work before any password or integrity check could reject it. The affected paths are the RFC 9579 PBMAC1 MAC calculator builders, which took the PBKDF2 iteration count and derived-key length straight out of PBMAC1Params (JcePBMac1CalculatorBuilder, and PKCS12PBEUtils.createPBMac1Calculator reached from PKCS12PfxPdu.isMacValid); the scrypt parallelization parameter p in the PKCS#8 and PKCS#12 cost guards, which bounded only the cost parameter N and the block size r even though the scratch buffer scales with r times p, so the configured memory ceiling could be evaded entirely; the raw JCA PBKDF2 provider (org.bouncycastle.jcajce.provider.symmetric.PBEPBKDF2); and the bcrypt round count read from an encrypted OpenSSH v1 private key's own kdfoptions. Each now bounds the parameter before deriving, in line with the caps already applied elsewhere in the tree, with the OpenSSH round count configurable through the new org.bouncycastle.openssh.max_rounds property. This completes the bounding begun in 1.85 for the PKCS#8 / PBES2 decryptors (CVE-2026-15055). This issue also affects Bouncy Castle for Java LTS before 2.73.13, and Bouncy Castle for Java FIPS (BC-FJA) before bcpkix-fips 1.0.13 (1.0.X series), 2.0.13 (2.0.X series) and 2.1.13 (2.1.X series).

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS