CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-111108

Low risk· EPSS 19%
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.27%

19th percentile - higher than 19% of all known CVEs

Summary

Apache Kafka's code-generated protocol readers pre-size an array's collection from the element count declared by the sender, checked only against the bytes remaining in the request buffer (assuming about one byte per element). For a keyed array the reader allocates an ImplicitLinkedHashCollection of capacity (2 * count + 1), so a request of a few tens of megabytes can force a heap allocation several times larger before any element is read. The pattern affects all Kafka API types with an array field.

Risk Assessment

An unauthenticated attacker can send a few concurrent requests declaring a very large array length and exhaust the broker heap, crashing it with an OutOfMemoryError. On listeners requiring authentication, valid credentials without specific ACLs suffice because parsing precedes authorization.

Recommendation

Upgrade to Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, or 4.4.0. Until then, lower socket.request.max.bytes and restrict network access to broker listeners, which reduces but does not remove exposure.

Other vulnerabilities in Apache Kafka

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

Apache Kafka's code-generated protocol readers pre-size an array's collection from the element count declared by the sender. That count is checked only against the bytes remaining in the request buffer, which assumes about one byte per element; because most elements need several bytes, a request can declare far more elements than the buffer holds and still pass. For a keyed array the reader then allocates an ImplicitLinkedHashCollection of capacity (2 * count +1), so a request of a few tens of megabytes can force a heap allocation several times larger before any element is read. The pattern is emitted into every generated reader, so it affects all Kafka API types with an array field.  Impact: Request parsing happens before any authorization check. On a listener that does not require authentication (for example PLAINTEXT), an unauthenticated attacker can send a few concurrent requests that each declare a very large= array length and allocate many times their wire size in broker heap, crashing the broker with an OutOfMemoryError. The reporter demonstrated three concurrent ~90 MB ProduceRequest (v3) connections exhausting a 1 GB heap (~8x amplification). On listeners that require authentication, the attacker needs valid credentials but no specific ACL, since parsing precedes authorization.. Mitigation: Upgrade to Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, or 4.4.0. Until then, lowering socket.request.max.bytes and restricting network access to broker listeners reduces, but does not remove, exposure. Resolution: From Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, and 4.4.0: generated readers cap the initial array pre-allocation at MessageUtil.MAX_PREALLOCATED_ARRAY_CAPACITY (1000) and grow it on demand, and reject a declared array length above MessageUtil.MAX_ARRAY_LENGTH (1,000,000).

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS