CVE-2026-110952
Low risk· EPSS 2%Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk2th percentile - higher than 2% of all known CVEs
Summary
An Apache Kafka broker authenticating clients via SASL/OAUTHBEARER with the bundled JWKS-backed validator always verifies the JWT signature, but does not enforce the issuer (iss) or audience (aud) claims unless sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer and sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience are explicitly configured. As a result, a validly signed token from a different issuer or lacking an aud claim may be accepted. Exposure mainly affects deployments whose JWKS endpoint serves signing keys for multiple issuers or shared signing keys.
Risk Assessment
In multi-tenant or shared-JWKS environments, an attacker could use a token minted for a different issuer or without an audience claim to authenticate, potentially as a higher-privileged principal. In single-issuer deployments with audience-scoped tokens, exposure is limited, and the signature trust anchor remains enforced in all cases.
Recommendation
Set both sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer (the provider's exact iss value) and sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience (the expected audience(s)) per listener. From Apache Kafka 4.4.0, a broker with a JWKS endpoint fails to start unless both are set, unless you intentionally opt out via sasl.oauthbearer.allow.unverified.issuer=true or sasl.oauthbearer.allow.unverified.audience=true.
Other vulnerabilities in Apache Kafka
See all- CVE-2026-33557Critical
In Apache Kafka, the default JWT validator class (`DefaultJwtValidator`) accepts any JWT token without validating its signature, issuer, or audience. An attacker can generate a token from any issuer with any username, and the broker will accept it.
- CVE-2026-83525Low risk· EPSS 8%
Incorrect operator (CWE-480) in the FetchSnapshot RPC handler in Apache Kafka from 2.8.0 before 4.2.2, and from 4.3.0 before 4.3.2, allows an authenticated attacker with CLUSTER_ACTION privilege to cause a denial of service. Exploitation occurs via a crafted FetchSnapshotRequest with an empty topics array or a topic with no partitions, terminating the controller process.
- CVE-2026-114349Low risk· EPSS 16%
A vulnerability in Apache Kafka allows an authenticated producer with Write permission on a topic to declare a decompressed body size of up to about 2 GiB in a compressed record, forcing a buffer allocation and causing an OutOfMemoryError. This can crash broker request-handler threads, consumers, and permanently stop the log-cleaner thread on compacted topics.
- CVE-2026-112375Low risk· EPSS 13%
An authenticated Kafka principal with no authorization grants can make a broker read a file or environment variable from the broker host and return its contents. An IncrementalAlterConfigs or AlterConfigs request targeting a BROKER resource reaches configuration validation before any authorization check, and configuration-variable resolution (${file:...}, ${env:...}) bypasses the config-providers allowlist added as mitigation for CVE-2024-31141.
- CVE-2026-111551Low risk· EPSS 13%
Several Apache Kafka deserialization paths read a size or count field from input data and use it directly to allocate an array, collection, or byte buffer without checking the bytes actually available. A small crafted input can declare a very large size and force a multi-gigabyte allocation, causing an OutOfMemoryError. Affected paths include ProcessorRecordContext, ChangedDeserializer, CombinedKeySchema, ProcessorMetadata, and AssignmentInfo in Kafka Streams, and ListDeserializer in the clients library.
- CVE-2026-111115Low risk· EPSS 15%
A vulnerability in Apache Kafka's code-generated readers for flexible protocol versions reads a tagged-field count declared by the sender and retains a RawTaggedField object for each unknown field. The count was bounded only by the outer request frame size, not by remaining buffer bytes or a fixed cap, allowing a modest request to declare tens of millions of tagged fields and force one object allocation per field. Flexible request headers are parsed before authorization, so the amplification applies pre-authentication.
- CVE-2026-111108Low risk· EPSS 19%
Apache Kafka's code-generated protocol readers pre-size an array's collection from the element count declared by the sender, checked only against the bytes remaining in the request buffer (assuming about one byte per element). For a keyed array the reader allocates an ImplicitLinkedHashCollection of capacity (2 * count + 1), so a request of a few tens of megabytes can force a heap allocation several times larger before any element is read. The pattern affects all Kafka API types with an array field.
- CVE-2026-111073Low risk· EPSS 10%
The vulnerability affects the broker-side PushTelemetry API (KIP-714) in Apache Kafka, which validates only the compressed size of a client's metrics payload against telemetry.max.bytes before decompressing it without any limit on the decompressed output size. A small, highly compressible payload can expand to hundreds of megabytes of broker heap, causing an OutOfMemoryError.
- CVE-2026-110985Low risk· EPSS 2%
In an Apache Kafka broker using SASL/OAUTHBEARER with the default validator (DefaultJwtValidator), when sasl.oauthbearer.jwks.endpoint.url is unset and no custom verification key resolver is supplied, the validator silently falls back to ClientJwtValidator, which does not verify the JWT signature, algorithm, or issuer. The broker starts without any warning and accepts any structurally valid JWT, including "alg":"none" tokens. This is the residual of CVE-2026-33557, whose fix restored signature verification only on the path where the JWKS endpoint URL is set.
- CVE-2026-41115Medium
An improper authorization vulnerability has been identified in Apache Kafka. The CONSUMER_GROUP_DESCRIBE (69) API validates the DESCRIBE operation on the GROUP resource instead of the READ operation as documented. This can result in misconfigured ACLs and unintended security postures.
Original NVD description (English source)
A Kafka broker that authenticates clients with SASL/OAUTHBEARER using the bundled JWKS-backed validator always verifies the JWT signature, but two further checks are only performed when explicitly configured: - The issuer (iss) claim is verified only when sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer is set. When it is unset, a validly-signed token carrying the expected audience is accepted regardless of which issuer minted it. - An audience (aud) claim is required only when sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience is set. When it is unset, a validly-signed token that omits the aud claim is accepted. (A token that carries an aud claim is still rejected when no expected audience is configured.) Both options default to unset and have been documented as optional (Importance LOW) since KIP-768 (3.1.0). Impact: The exposure is realizable mainly in deployments whose JWKS endpoint serves signing keys for more than one issuer (a multi-tenant identity provider, an aggregated/shared JWKS, or shared signing keys): a token minted for a different issuer, or a token lacking an audience, may be accepted to authenticate — potentially as a higher-privileged principal. In a single-issuer deployment where the provider controls the iss claim and issues audience-scoped tokens, exposure is limited. The signature trust anchor remains enforced in all cases. This is distinct from CVE-2026-33557 (acceptance of unsigned/unvalidated tokens); here the signature is validated and only the issuer/audience checks are not enforced by default. Mitigation (all affected versions, no upgrade required): Set both sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer (to your provider's exact iss value) and sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience (to the audience(s) your brokers expect), per listener. Brokers that set these perform exact-match issuer/audience checks and are not affected. Both have been available since 3.1.0. Resolution: - From Apache Kafka 4.4.0: a broker configured with a JWKS endpoint fails to start unless both sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer and sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience are set (secure by default). Deployments that intentionally do not restrict the issuer and/or audience may opt out per axis with sasl.oauthbearer.allow.unverified.issuer=true and/or sasl.oauthbearer.allow.unverified.audience=true.
Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS

