CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-110952

Low risk· EPSS 2%
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.12%

2th percentile - higher than 2% of all known CVEs

Summary

An Apache Kafka broker authenticating clients via SASL/OAUTHBEARER with the bundled JWKS-backed validator always verifies the JWT signature, but does not enforce the issuer (iss) or audience (aud) claims unless sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer and sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience are explicitly configured. As a result, a validly signed token from a different issuer or lacking an aud claim may be accepted. Exposure mainly affects deployments whose JWKS endpoint serves signing keys for multiple issuers or shared signing keys.

Risk Assessment

In multi-tenant or shared-JWKS environments, an attacker could use a token minted for a different issuer or without an audience claim to authenticate, potentially as a higher-privileged principal. In single-issuer deployments with audience-scoped tokens, exposure is limited, and the signature trust anchor remains enforced in all cases.

Recommendation

Set both sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer (the provider's exact iss value) and sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience (the expected audience(s)) per listener. From Apache Kafka 4.4.0, a broker with a JWKS endpoint fails to start unless both are set, unless you intentionally opt out via sasl.oauthbearer.allow.unverified.issuer=true or sasl.oauthbearer.allow.unverified.audience=true.

Other vulnerabilities in Apache Kafka

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Original NVD description (English source)

A Kafka broker that authenticates clients with SASL/OAUTHBEARER using the bundled JWKS-backed validator always verifies the JWT signature, but two further checks are only performed when explicitly configured: - The issuer (iss) claim is verified only when sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer is set. When it is unset, a validly-signed token carrying the expected audience is accepted regardless of which issuer minted it. - An audience (aud) claim is required only when sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience is set. When it is unset, a validly-signed token that omits the aud claim is accepted. (A token that carries an aud claim is still rejected when no expected audience is configured.) Both options default to unset and have been documented as optional (Importance LOW) since KIP-768 (3.1.0). Impact: The exposure is realizable mainly in deployments whose JWKS endpoint serves signing keys for more than one issuer (a multi-tenant identity provider, an aggregated/shared JWKS, or shared signing keys): a token minted for a different issuer, or a token lacking an audience, may be accepted to authenticate — potentially as a higher-privileged principal. In a single-issuer deployment where the provider controls the iss claim and issues audience-scoped tokens, exposure is limited. The signature trust anchor remains enforced in all cases. This is distinct from CVE-2026-33557 (acceptance of unsigned/unvalidated tokens); here the signature is validated and only the issuer/audience checks are not enforced by default. Mitigation (all affected versions, no upgrade required): Set both sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer (to your provider's exact iss value) and sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience (to the audience(s) your brokers expect), per listener. Brokers that set these perform exact-match issuer/audience checks and are not affected. Both have been available since 3.1.0. Resolution: - From Apache Kafka 4.4.0: a broker configured with a JWKS endpoint fails to start unless both sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer and sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience are set (secure by default). Deployments that intentionally do not restrict the issuer and/or audience may opt out per axis with sasl.oauthbearer.allow.unverified.issuer=true and/or sasl.oauthbearer.allow.unverified.audience=true.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS