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CVE-2026-84170

WysokieCVSS 8.3
Opublikowano: Zaktualizowano: Przetłumaczono: NVD NIST

Streszczenie

Podatność w Apache Wicket dotyczy zasobu AbstractFileUploadResource (serwerowa strona uploadu bez formularza z FileUploadToResourceField). Limity rozmiaru żądania, pojedynczego pliku i liczby części są pobierane z parametrów żądania (maxSize, fileMaxSize, fileCountMax) zamiast z konfiguracji aplikacji, więc klient może je dowolnie zawyżyć lub pominąć. Zasób nie ma adnotacji autoryzacyjnej, więc domyślnie żądanie nie wymaga uwierzytelnienia.

Ocena ryzyka

Atakujący może jednym powtarzalnym żądaniem wyczerpać dysk (pliki trafiają do katalogu tymczasowego i folderu IUploadsFileManager) lub pamięć heap (części niebędące plikami są wczytywane w całości), powodując odmowę usługi. Brak wymaganej autoryzacji obniża próg wejścia dla atakującego.

Rekomendacja

Zaktualizuj Apache Wicket do wersji 9.25.0 lub 10.12.0. Jeśli aktualizacja nie jest możliwa, zabezpiecz zasób uploadu własną autoryzacją i ogranicz limity na poziomie serwera/proxy.

Inne podatności w Apache Wicket

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Oryginalny opis (angielski, źródło NVD)

Allocation of resources without limits or throttling in Apache Wicket. org.apache.wicket.markup.html.form.upload.resource.AbstractFileUploadResource is the server side of the form-less upload offered by FileUploadToResourceField, which posts the selected files to a separately mounted resource rather than through a Form. The resource is an application-wide singleton with no component to consult, so newResourceResponse() takes the three limits that bound the upload - the total request size, the maximum size of a single part and the maximum number of parts - from the request parameters maxSize, fileMaxSize and fileCountMax, and hands them to the multipart parser as they arrive. Nothing binds those numbers to the field that is supposed to be uploading. A request naming a very large maxSize is therefore parsed with no effective ceiling on the total size, and omitting fileMaxSize and fileCountMax leaves the per-part and part-count limits unset as well. The values the application configured through FileUploadToResourceField#setMaxSize(), #setFileMaxSize() and #setFileCountMax() are consulted only when the client omits the corresponding parameter, so against a client that supplies one they have no effect at all. Parts above the parser's in-memory threshold are spooled to the container's temporary directory, and the file parts are then copied into the folder the application's IUploadsFileManager owns, under a sub-folder the request names, where they remain. A part that is not a file is read into the heap in full while the request is parsed. One request, repeatable, can therefore consume as much disk or as much heap as the client chooses to send. The resource carries no authorization annotation and the default authorization strategy permits every resource request, so unless the application authorizes the resource itself the request needs no authentication, no session, no prior page view and no user interaction. An application is affected where it uses FileUploadToResourceField, or mounts FileUploadResourceReference itself. This is not the ordinary upload path: the resource is a singleton that has to be created and mounted deliberately. An application that configures no upload limit at all loses nothing, because Wicket applies no total-size limit of its own by default; what the defect removes is a limit the application set. Uploads through Form with FileUploadField, and through AjaxFileDropBehavior, are not affected, because both read their limits from the component rather than from the request. The upload resource does not exist in the 8.x line. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 9.14.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.9.1. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue.

Dane podatności pochodzą z NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS