GHSA-r7g4-qg5f-qqm2

Nodemailer's disableFileAccess/disableUrlAccess options are a security sandbox that forbids untrusted message content from reading local files or making outbound HTTP(S) requests. The fix for GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f may be incomplete, allowing bypass of the sandbox.

A vulnerability in the Nodemailer library allows header injection via the `list.*.comment` field, which is not sanitized for CR (`\r`) and LF (`\n`) characters. An attacker can supply a malicious value in this field, leading to email header spoofing.

A vulnerability in Nodemailer allows bypassing the `disableFileAccess` and `disableUrlAccess` options when using `jsonTransport`. While the normal MIME streaming path enforces these restrictions, `jsonTransport` serializes the message in a way that bypasses them, potentially enabling access to local files or external URLs.

Nodemailer's address parser parses comma-separated addresses in quadratic time (O(n²)) in the number of addresses. A single crafted address string (e.g., To, Cc, Bcc, From, Reply-To) can cause significant slowdown.

In nodemailer v9.0.0, the message-level `raw` option bypasses `disableFileAccess` and `disableUrlAccess` protections, enabling arbitrary file reads and full SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) in the sent message.

Nodemailer resolves an international (IDN / non-ASCII) recipient domain to a different Punycode label than every UTS-46-conformant parser (web browsers, WHATWG URL Standard, Node's url.domainToASCII, Python's idna). Its address normalizer (_normalizeAddress) may lead to incorrect domain resolution, enabling phishing or message misdirection.

Nodemailer's email-address parser treats an RFC 5322 comment inside the domain as a point to concatenate the surrounding text, rather than as folding whitespace (CFWS) that terminates the domain. This can lead to incorrect parsing, e.g., [email protected](x)evil.c..., potentially redirecting messages or bypassing validation.

Nodemailer before 8.0.4 is vulnerable to SMTP command injection through the unsanitized envelope.size parameter. When an application passes a custom envelope object with a size property containing CRLF characters to sendMail(), the value is concatenated into the SMTP MAIL FROM command (as SIZE=...) without sanitization, allowing injection of arbitrary SMTP commands such as RCPT TO to silently add attacker-controlled recipients.

Nodemailer before 9.1.0 fails to apply UTS-46 normalization when encoding international domain names, causing the domain resolver to compute a different Punycode A-label than standards-compliant parsers. Attackers can craft recipient addresses with invisible characters or compatibility mappings that pass domain allow-list checks but are delivered to attacker-controlled domains via SMTP.

Nodemailer versions >= 6.9.16 and < 9.1.0 mis-parse RFC 5322 comments in email addresses. A comment closed immediately before a non-break character causes the tokenizer to concatenate the atoms surrounding the comment, so an address like [email protected](x)evil.com is read as the domain good-corp.comevil.com. This can lead to delivery to an attacker-controlled domain. Fixed in 9.1.0.