GHSA-cc9r-2j5m-2m83
MediumSummary
Nodemailer's email-address parser treats an RFC 5322 comment inside the domain as a point to concatenate the surrounding text, rather than as folding whitespace (CFWS) that terminates the domain. This can lead to incorrect parsing, e.g., [email protected](x)evil.c..., potentially redirecting messages or bypassing validation.
Risk Assessment
An attacker could exploit this to change the target address of a message, potentially directing it to a malicious domain or bypassing security filters.
Recommendation
Update Nodemailer to a patched version of the address parser and test handling of addresses with comments.
Other vulnerabilities in Nodemailer
See all- CVE-2026-90776High
Nodemailer versions 9.1.0 through 10.0.4 contain a quadratic time complexity vulnerability in the addressparser component when parsing email addresses with RFC 5322 comments. Attackers can craft malicious email headers with comment-separated atoms to consume excessive CPU and block the Node.js event loop for several seconds, causing denial of service.
- GHSA-r7g4-qg5f-qqm2Medium
Nodemailer disables TLS certificate verification in its internal HTTPS fetch client by setting rejectUnauthorized: false in lib/fetch/index.js. This causes OAuth2 token requests to trust invalid or self-signed HTTPS certificates.
- GHSA-268h-hp4c-crq3Medium
A vulnerability in the Nodemailer library allows header injection via the `list.*.comment` field, which is not sanitized for CR (`\r`) and LF (`\n`) characters. An attacker can supply a malicious value in this field, leading to email header spoofing.
- GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66fMedium
A vulnerability in Nodemailer allows bypassing the `disableFileAccess` and `disableUrlAccess` options when using `jsonTransport`. While the normal MIME streaming path enforces these restrictions, `jsonTransport` serializes the message in a way that bypasses them, potentially enabling access to local files or external URLs.
- GHSA-2x7j-588g-ccc2High
Nodemailer's address parser parses comma-separated addresses in quadratic time (O(n²)) in the number of addresses. A single crafted address string (e.g., To, Cc, Bcc, From, Reply-To) can cause significant slowdown.
- GHSA-p6gq-j5cr-w38fHigh
In nodemailer v9.0.0, the message-level `raw` option bypasses `disableFileAccess` and `disableUrlAccess` protections, enabling arbitrary file reads and full SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) in the sent message.
- GHSA-8m3c-c648-2xjjMedium
Nodemailer's disableFileAccess/disableUrlAccess options are a security sandbox that forbids untrusted message content from reading local files or making outbound HTTP(S) requests. The fix for GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f may be incomplete, allowing bypass of the sandbox.
- GHSA-wmmp-3585-3rmpMedium
Nodemailer resolves an international (IDN / non-ASCII) recipient domain to a different Punycode label than every UTS-46-conformant parser (web browsers, WHATWG URL Standard, Node's url.domainToASCII, Python's idna). Its address normalizer (_normalizeAddress) may lead to incorrect domain resolution, enabling phishing or message misdirection.
- CVE-2026-82854Critical
Nodemailer before 8.0.4 is vulnerable to SMTP command injection through the unsanitized envelope.size parameter. When an application passes a custom envelope object with a size property containing CRLF characters to sendMail(), the value is concatenated into the SMTP MAIL FROM command (as SIZE=...) without sanitization, allowing injection of arbitrary SMTP commands such as RCPT TO to silently add attacker-controlled recipients.
- CVE-2026-82853Medium
Nodemailer versions before 8.0.5 contain an SMTP command injection vulnerability in the transport name option used in EHLO/HELO commands. The name parameter is concatenated directly into SMTP commands without sanitizing carriage return and line feed characters, allowing attackers to inject arbitrary SMTP commands for email spoofing and phishing attacks.
Original NVD description (English source)
### Summary Nodemailer's email-address parser treats an **RFC 5322 comment** `( ... )` inside the domain as a point to **concatenate** the surrounding text, rather than as folding whitespace (CFWS) that **terminates** the domain. Consequently a recipient address such as `[email protected](x)evil.c

