CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-99059

HighCVSS 7.7
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.44%

39th percentile - higher than 39% of all known CVEs

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the WireGuard noise subsystem has a race condition when two threads process the same response message, potentially reusing handshake state and creating a new session from stale state. The issue is considered very difficult to trigger in practice and was fixed by comparing the ephemeral private key with the peer's latest handshake state.

Risk Assessment

Exploitation is unlikely in practice, but it could theoretically cause incorrect WireGuard session state and affect tunnel confidentiality or integrity. Organizations using WireGuard should treat this as a kernel bug requiring patching.

Recommendation

Update the Linux kernel to a version containing the fix for CVE-2026-99059. If immediate patching is not possible, limit WireGuard exposure and monitor for unusual session behavior.

Related vulnerabilities

Original NVD description (English source)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wireguard: noise: reject response consumption after intermediate initiation Two threads begin processing the identical response message, received twice. The first thread, A, runs. While it's running, the second one, B, gets partway through, and during that slow calculation, or even while blocking on down_write(), A completes and then also a handshake initiation that's already been queued up runs in thread C, which itself takes that same down_write(). The handshake initiation creation succeeds, and sets the state back to waiting-for-response, and calls up_write(), at which point thread B resumes, because either its finished its calculations or was finally allowed to acquire down_write(). Thread B then copies the state back to the peer, and begins a new session, using that state, which is the same session as the one made in thread A. Thread A Thread B Thread C down_read() sA = handshake->state memcpy(cA, handshake->crypto) up_read() if (sA != 1) goto fail slow_crypto(cA) down_read() sB = handshake->state memcpy(cB, handshake->crypto) up_read() if (sB != 1) goto fail slow_crypto(cB) down_write() if (sA != handshake->state) goto fail memcpy(handshake->crypto, cA) handshake->state = 2 up_write() down_write() if (handshake->state != 2) goto fail derive_session(handshake->crypto) up_write() down_write() slow_crypto(handshake->crypto) handshake->state = 1 up_write() down_write() if (sB != handshake->state) goto fail memcpy(handshake->crypto, cB) handshake->state = 2 up_write() down_write() if (handshake->state != 2) goto fail derive_session(handshake->crypto) up_write() This seems basically impossible to hit in a meaningful way in practice, but ensure that it absolutely cannot happen by comparing the ephemeral private key that's on the stack with the latest one that the peer's handshake state has.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS