CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-90979

HighCVSS 7.3
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.44%

36th percentile - higher than 36% of all known CVEs

Summary

LDAPCache and LDAPBackingEngine build LDAP search filters by substituting %u, %dn, and %fqdn into administrator-configured filter templates (userFilter, roleFilter) without full RFC 4515 escaping. Before the fix, only double backslashing was applied, which does not escape *, (, ), and NUL. A login name containing these characters can alter the filter structure, e.g. turning an equality match into a wildcard match or closing/reopening filter clauses.

Risk Assessment

The vulnerability can cause a login or role lookup to match an LDAP entry other than the intended one, over-granting roles, or potentially affecting which account a login resolves to. It is not exploitable through every entry point — LDAPLoginModule and LDAPPubkeyLoginModule escape the login name, but GSSAPILdapLoginModule and LDAPBackingEngine (listRoles) pass it through unescaped.

Recommendation

Apply the vendor fix that introduces full RFC 4515 escaping (*, (, ), NUL) in LDAPCache and LDAPBackingEngine. Until the fix is deployed, restrict the ability to create login names containing these characters and review the userFilter and roleFilter templates.

Related vulnerabilities

Original NVD description (English source)

LDAPCache and LDAPBackingEngine build LDAP search filters for user lookup and role lookup by textually substituting the placeholders %u, %dn, and %fqdn (drawn from the login name, the resolved user DN, and its fully qualified namespace form) into administrator-configured filter templates (userFilter, roleFilter). Before the fix, the only sanitization applied to the substituted value was double backslashed: filter = filter.replaceAll(Pattern.quote("%u"), Matcher.quoteReplacement(user)); filter = filter.replace("\\", "\\\\"); This does not escape the other characters RFC 4515 requires escaping in an LDAP search filter: *, (, ), and NUL. A login name containing any of these can change the structure of the resulting filter rather than being matched as a literal value (e.g. a crafted username can turn an equality match into a wildcard match, or close/reopen filter clauses), widening what the search returns and potentially causing a login or role lookup to match an LDAP entry other than the intended one, over-granting roles, and depending on deployment-specific filter templates, potentially affecting which account a login resolved to. It's not exploitable through every entry points: LDAPLoginModule and LDAPPubkeyLoginModule both called Util.doRFC2254Encoding() (correct RFC 4515 escaping) on the login name before handing it to LDAPCache, which masked the missing escaping in LDAPCache for those two call paths. Using LDAPCache directly (bypassing the login modules) does not reproduce through the normal LDAPLoginModule/LDAPPubkeyLoginModule authentication flow for this reason. It does reproduce through two other call paths that reach LDAPCache/LDAPBackingEngine without any prior escaping: * GSSAPILdapLoginModule passes the NameCallback name straight through, unescaped. * LDAPBackingEngine (listRoles) passes principal.getName() straight through, unescaped.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS