CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-90200

Unknown
Published: Translated: NVD NIST

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the ntfs_init_from_boot() function in the fs/ntfs3 driver has an integer overflow when validating MFT cluster numbers from the boot sector. The multiplication mlcn * sct_per_clst is performed in u64 and can wrap for large mlcn values, bypassing the volume size check and accepting a malformed record. In practice this causes NTFS mounts to fail in odd places.

Risk Assessment

The vulnerability can be exploited by a local user to cause a denial of service (failed mount) by supplying a crafted NTFS image or media. It does not currently lead to code execution or privilege escalation because reads are caught at a lower layer, but the flawed validation poses a future risk.

Recommendation

Update the Linux kernel to a version containing the fix that uses check_mul_overflow() to detect overflow when computing MFT sector positions. Until patched, avoid mounting untrusted NTFS images and media.

Other vulnerabilities in Linux kernel (fs/ntfs3)

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Original NVD description (English source)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: fix integer overflow in MFT cluster validation In ntfs_init_from_boot(), the boot sector's MFT cluster numbers are validated against the volume size with: if (mlcn * sct_per_clst >= sectors || mlcn2 * sct_per_clst >= sectors) goto out; mlcn and mlcn2 are u64 fields read directly from the boot sector. sct_per_clst is bounded above by 4096 (true_sectors_per_clst() plus the is_power_of_2() check below it), but the multiplication is done in u64 and wraps when mlcn (or mlcn2) is large enough -- e.g. mlcn near 2^62 with sct_per_clst == 4 wraps to 0, which compares below any non-zero 'sectors', so the check is bypassed and the malformed record is accepted. The accepted mlcn is then used unchanged in sbi->mft.lbo = mlcn << cluster_bits; In practice the resulting reads fail at the block layer (sb_bread() returns NULL via grow_buffers()'s check_mul_overflow() guard), so today this manifests as mount failing in odd places rather than as something more dangerous, but the validation step is still wrong and there is no reason for callers to rely on the block layer to catch a value that should never have been accepted in the first place. Use check_mul_overflow() to compute the two sector positions and fail the mount if either multiplication wraps; this preserves the existing semantics (mlcn * sct_per_clst >= sectors) instead of switching to division (mlcn >= sectors / sct_per_clst), which would tighten the check at edge cases where 'sectors' is not a multiple of sct_per_clst. The check_*_overflow() style is the one ntfs3 already uses for similar on-disk arithmetic in fs/ntfs3/run.c.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS