CVE-2026-89617
UnknownSummary
In the Linux kernel, the fs/ntfs3 driver does not validate the dirty page table during log replay. A crafted DIR_PAGE_ENTRY with an invalid lcns_follow field lets the v0->v1 conversion and later replay passes run off the entry.
Risk Assessment
An attacker can mount a crafted NTFS image, leading to out-of-bounds memory access in the kernel and potential system crash or code execution.
Recommendation
Update the Linux kernel to a version containing the check_dp_table() function that rejects entries larger than their declared size.
Other vulnerabilities in Linux kernel (fs/ntfs3)
See all- CVE-2026-89616Unknown
In the Linux kernel, ni_read_frame() in fs/ntfs3 trusts decompress_lznt()'s return value, which may be smaller than the frame size. Unwritten bytes remain in the vmapped pages and are returned to userspace, disclosing uninitialized kernel memory.
- CVE-2026-89615Unknown
In the Linux kernel, the copy_lcns and redo shorten loops in fs/ntfs3 index page_lcns[] based on the log record's lcns_follow, which is not checked against the target entry. A crafted record can overflow page_lcns[] of an otherwise valid entry.
- CVE-2026-45864Medium
In the Linux kernel's NTFS3 filesystem, an infinite loop vulnerability was found when processing the range [valid : pos). If the valid value cannot be read correctly and remains the same, a process hang may occur, as reported by syzbot. A check was added to detect unchanged valid values and return -EINVAL.
- CVE-2025-71311High
In the Linux kernel, the NTFS3 filesystem has a vulnerability involving the use of uninitialized folios. Newly allocated folios are not marked as uptodate, and the ni_read_frame() function is skipped when the caller expects the frame to be completely overwritten, leaving part of the memory uninitialized.
Original NVD description (English source)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: validate dirty page table on log replay Each DIR_PAGE_ENTRY ends in a page_lcns[] array whose length is the on-disk lcns_follow field. check_rstbl() validates the table bookkeeping but never checks that this array fits in the entry, so a crafted lcns_follow lets the v0->v1 conversion memmove and later replay passes run off the entry. Add check_dp_table() to reject, right after check_rstbl(), any entry larger than its size claims via struct_size() (the same expression used to allocate these entries, so the check is overflow-safe by construction). All consumers can then trust lcns_follow as the real capacity. This covers every page_lcns[] access whose index is bounded by the entry itself (the conversion memmove, the HotFix store via find_dp(), and the self-bounded scan loops). Accesses whose index comes from the log record need a separate bound and are handled in a follow-up patch.