CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-90018

HighCVSS 8.8
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.45%

38th percentile - higher than 38% of all known CVEs

Summary

The rtw_get_wps_attr() function in the Linux kernel's staging rtl8723bs driver fails to validate the WPS attribute length taken from a wireless management frame. This attacker-controlled length is used unchecked as the size for a memcpy(), causing a heap out-of-bounds read and a stack buffer overflow. The flaw can be triggered by a crafted WPS IE in a beacon or probe response processed during scanning.

Risk Assessment

An attacker within radio range can remotely overflow the stack of the parsing thread, potentially causing a crash or arbitrary code execution in kernel context. Systems with the rtl8723bs driver active are affected.

Recommendation

Update the Linux kernel to a version containing the fix that adds a length check for the WPS attribute before it is used in memcpy(). If immediate patching is not possible, consider disabling or blacklisting the rtl8723bs driver module.

Related vulnerabilities

Original NVD description (English source)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read / stack overflow in rtw_get_wps_attr() rtw_get_wps_attr() walks WPS attributes inside a WPS IE taken from a wireless management frame. For each candidate attribute it only checks that the fixed 4-byte attribute header (2-byte ID + 2-byte length) fits inside the IE: if (attr_ptr + 4 > wps_ie + wps_ielen) break; u16 attr_id = get_unaligned_be16(attr_ptr); u16 attr_data_len = get_unaligned_be16(attr_ptr + 2); u16 attr_len = attr_data_len + 4; attr_data_len (and therefore attr_len) is read directly from the wire and is never checked against the remaining bytes in the IE before being used as the size of: memcpy(buf_attr, attr_ptr, attr_len); Since attr_len is fully attacker controlled (0 to 65535+4), this is both a heap OOB read of wps_ie, and, more seriously, a stack buffer overflow at several call sites where buf_attr is a single-byte stack variable, e.g. rtw_get_wps_attr_content()'s callers passing WPS_ATTR_SELECTED_REGISTRAR into a stack "u8 sr"/"u8 selected_registrar" (drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c, drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c). A crafted WPS IE in a beacon or probe response processed during scanning can therefore smash the stack of the parsing thread. rtw_get_wps_attr_content() itself has no independent length check and simply trusts the attr_len it gets back from rtw_get_wps_attr(), so fixing the bound here also fixes that caller. The "attr_ptr + 4 > wps_ie + wps_ielen" header check above was added by commit 1463ca3ec6601 ("staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in rtw_get_sec_ie(), rtw_get_wapi_ie(), and rtw_get_wps_attr()"), which bounded the fixed header but never extended the check to cover the variable-length attribute data that follows it. Add that missing check before attr_len is used as a memcpy() length or accepted as a match.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS