CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-89894

HighCVSS 7.8
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.16%

5th percentile - higher than 5% of all known CVEs

Summary

A vulnerability was found in the Linux kernel cx231xx media driver where format or standard changes (vidioc_s_fmt_vid_cap, vidioc_s_std) were rejected only when the video queue was busy, not the VBI queue. Since the VBI queue shares the same geometry (dev->width, dev->norm), an application could enlarge the width or switch to PAL while the VBI stream was running, causing a heap out-of-bounds write in cx231xx_do_vbi_copy().

Risk Assessment

A local attacker with access to a cx231xx device can trigger a heap out-of-bounds write, leading to kernel memory corruption, system crash, or potentially arbitrary code execution with kernel privileges.

Recommendation

Update the Linux kernel to a version containing the fix that rejects format and standard changes when the VBI queue is busy as well. Until patched, restrict access to cx231xx devices to trusted users only.

Related vulnerabilities

Original NVD description (English source)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: cx231xx: reject geometry changes while the VBI queue is busy vidioc_s_fmt_vid_cap() and vidioc_s_std() change the device-wide dev->width / dev->norm but only refuse the change when the *video* queue (dev->vidq) is busy. The VBI queue (dev->vbiq) shares that same geometry: cx231xx_init_vbi_isoc() latches dma_q->lines_per_field from dev->norm, the VBI videobuf2 plane is sized from dev->width / dev->norm in vbi_queue_setup() and vbi_buf_prepare(), and cx231xx_do_vbi_copy() then recomputes the destination offset from the *live* dev->width and the latched lines_per_field on every URB completion: offset = lines_completed * (dev->width << 1) + ...; if (dma_q->current_field == 2) offset += dev->width * 2 * dma_q->lines_per_field; memcpy(plane + offset, p_buffer, lencopy); Because the VBI node shares video_ioctl_ops with the video node, an application can size a small VBI plane (REQBUFS/QBUF with a small width, or with the NTSC standard), then enlarge dev->width (or switch dev->norm to PAL) through the video node while the VBI stream is running -- the change is allowed because only dev->vidq is checked -- and let the device deliver a field-2 VBI payload. cx231xx_do_vbi_copy() now computes the offset with the larger geometry and memcpy()s past the end of the smaller plane that was already allocated, a heap out-of-bounds write whose offset is attacker-chosen and whose contents come from the device. The per-field guard in cx231xx_copy_vbi_line() does not help: it bounds the copy against the latched lines_per_field, not the plane's real capacity, and vb2 does not re-run buf_prepare() for an already prepared buffer. Refuse the format/standard change when the VBI queue is busy as well, so the geometry cannot change underneath an allocated VBI buffer.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS