CVE-2026-8889

Securly Chrome Extension version 3.0.7 downloads config.json over HTTP and compiles server-provided patterns as JavaScript regular expressions via new RegExp() without complexity validation. An on-path attacker can inject patterns causing catastrophic backtracking, resulting in denial of service on all browsing.

Securly Chrome Extension version 3.0.7 uses EVP_BytesToKey with MD5 and a single iteration for AES encryption. MD5 has been broken since 2004 and a single iteration provides no key stretching, weakening the encryption.

Securly Chrome Extension version 3.0.7 dynamically registers content13.min.js as a content script not declared in manifest.json, bypassing Chrome Web Store static security review. It runs on all URLs, immediately hides all page content, creates a full-page overlay, pauses all videos, and only restores content when the service worker confirms the page passes filtering. If Securly's servers are unreachable, pages remain indefinitely hidden.

Version 3.0.7 of the Securly Chrome Extension exposes multiple publicly accessible endpoints that allow unauthenticated access to sensitive data. The exposed information consists of SHA-1 hashes obfuscated with a simple Caesar cipher that can be easily reversed.

Version 3.0.7 of the Securly Chrome Extension contains hardcoded, plaintext AES passphrases in securly.min.js. These keys decrypt crisis alert keyword data and intervention site data.

Securly Chrome Extension version 3.0.7 downloads JSON files containing crisis alert keywords and filtering rules over unencrypted HTTP via the Fetch API. Other endpoints in the same extension correctly fetch IWF and CIPA data over HTTPS, demonstrating an inconsistent TLS implementation.