CVE-2026-84716
MediumCVSS 6.6Summary
A flaw exists in the automation-controller install-bundle endpoint. A System Administrator can register a case variant of an existing control node's hostname and obtain an X.509 certificate signed by the receptor mesh CA, valid for ten years, with no issuance log or revocation list. Because the hostname charset validator is case-insensitive while the uniqueness validator is case-sensitive, TLS peers accept the certificate as that control node.
Risk Assessment
In managed/hosted deployments where the customer holds controller superuser but the platform operator runs the mesh, an attacker with an on-path position can impersonate or intercept TLS traffic of control/hybrid mesh nodes. The credential is long-lived and non-revocable, making it difficult to invalidate.
Recommendation
Update automation-controller to a version containing the fix as soon as possible; until then, restrict the ability of System Administrators to register hostnames and monitor for unusual mesh certificates. Also verify that no case variants of existing hostnames have been registered.
Other vulnerabilities in automation-controller
See all- CVE-2026-84713Medium
A flaw in the automation-controller notification subsystem causes the recipient value from NotificationTemplate.notification_configuration to be copied in clear text into the unprotected Notification.recipients field on every send. Because the credential-types endpoint is listable by any authenticated user and the API filter backend traverses object relations without per-hop authorization, a user with no privileges can use a relational filter as a boolean count-oracle to recover, character by character and across organizations, the secret recipient values of other tenants' notifications, including PagerDuty service keys and Slack/Mattermost/RocketChat/Webhook bearer-token URLs. This flaw affects confidentiality.
- CVE-2026-84712Medium
In the automation-controller API, the unauthenticated health-check endpoint /api/v2/ping/ (ApiV2PingView, AllowAny) over-serializes RBAC-gated automation-mesh data into its anonymous response, exposing the full instance inventory (node hostnames, node types, UUIDs, heartbeats, capacities, and exact versions), all instance-group names and membership, the deployment install UUID, and the active control node. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can use this to map the control plane and fingerprint software versions for targeted attacks. This flaw affects confidentiality only; it does not expose secrets, credentials, or tenant data.
Original NVD description (English source)
A flaw was found in the automation-controller instance install-bundle endpoint. When a System Administrator downloads an execution/hop node's install bundle, the controller signs an X.509 certificate with the receptor mesh certificate authority in which the Common Name, DNS subject-alternative-name, and receptor node-id are taken verbatim from the caller-chosen instance hostname, with a hard-coded ten-year validity, a random serial, and no issuance log or revocation list. Because the hostname charset validator is case-insensitive while the uniqueness validator is case-sensitive, an administrator can register a case variant of an existing control node's hostname and obtain a mesh-CA-signed certificate that TLS peers, which match hostnames case-insensitively, accept as that control node. In managed/hosted deployments — where the customer holds controller superuser but the platform operator runs the mesh — this yields a long-lived, non-revocable mesh peer credential and, with an on-path position, TLS impersonation or interception of control/hybrid mesh nodes. It does not grant direct remote code execution, because receptor work submission is gated by a separate signing key not included in the bundle.