CVE-2026-84706

In Ansible Automation Platform automation controller, the external logging (rsyslog) configuration is generated by interpolating user-controlled settings into an rsyslog RainerScript config file without neutralizing RainerScript syntax. A privileged user can inject rsyslog directives, including an omprog action, causing arbitrary command execution inside the control-plane rsyslog component.

An argument-injection flaw exists in the Ansible Automation Platform automation-controller system-job subsystem. The system-job template launch endpoint stores a user-supplied "days" variable without integer validation, and the dispatcher flattens the management-command argument list into a single space-separated string, so spaces become additional arguments. An authenticated superuser can inject arbitrary arguments, including Python's path option, into the awx-manage process.

A server-side request forgery flaw exists in the Ansible Automation Platform automation-controller email notification backend. The backend passes the user-supplied SMTP host and port from a notification template directly to the SMTP client without validating that the target is not an internal, loopback, link-local, or reserved address. An authenticated user with organization notification-admin permission can create a template pointing at an arbitrary internal address and trigger a test, opening a raw TCP connection.

In Ansible Automation Platform automation-controller, the WorkflowJobNode.ancestor_artifacts database column, storing raw merged set_stats artifacts propagated between workflow nodes, is not wrapped in prevent_search() and is accepted for arbitrary field lookups by the REST filter backend, even though it is omitted from the API serializer. Because the column is persisted before Ansible's no_log masking is applied, a user with read access to a workflow can use the result count as an oracle to recover, character by character, values marked no_log.

In Ansible Automation Platform automation-controller, in the shipped production configuration, the Controller trusts the client-supplied X-Forwarded-For header as the request's client IP without verifying it originated from a trusted proxy, and selects the leftmost (attacker-controlled) header value. An attacker can forge the source IP address recorded in the Controller's audit and access logs.

In Ansible Automation Platform automation-controller, the unauthenticated Bitbucket Data Center webhook receiver skips HMAC signature verification for diagnostics:ping events after looking up the target template, returning HTTP 200 for a template with a Bitbucket DC webhook configured and HTTP 403 otherwise. An unauthenticated remote attacker can use this response discrepancy as an oracle to enumerate which Job Template and Workflow Job Template IDs have Bitbucket DC webhooks configured, without knowing the secret webhook_key.

In automation-controller, the sanitize_jinja() function uses regular expressions that stop at the first interior '}' or '%' character, so a Jinja expression containing an inner brace (e.g., an empty dict) is accepted while remaining valid Jinja. Because sanitize_jinja() is the sole guard on several launch-time fields, a low-privileged user can inject Jinja that ansible-core evaluates in the execution environment.

In Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform's automation-controller, the setting that formats the log message for API 4XX errors is an administrator-controlled Python format-string template rendered with a live user object as an argument. An administrator can craft a template that walks from the user object into the application settings and reads the Django secret key and the database password, and the formatted message is written to a logger that can be forwarded to an external log aggregator.

In Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform's automation-controller, the HTML view of job, ad hoc command, project update, and inventory update standard output escapes HTML metacharacters but does not remove ANSI terminal escape sequences before conversion to HTML. An ANSI OSC 8 hyperlink sequence in the output is expanded into an HTML anchor whose href is not scheme-filtered or escaped, so a low-privileged user can embed a javascript: link rendered into a text/html response with no Content-Security-Policy.