CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-81568

HighCVSS 8.7
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.33%

26th percentile - higher than 26% of all known CVEs

Summary

In the Joomla extension J2Store, J2StoreModelOrderdownloads::getFilePath() built the on-disk path to a purchased digital download by concatenating the configured attachment folder with the product file's stored product_file_save_name, using only JPath::clean() (which normalises separators but does not resolve or reject .. segments) and a plain JFile::exists() check. If a product file's product_file_save_name contained a ../ traversal segment, any customer holding a valid download token/pid pair could have the traversal resolve to a path outside the attachment folder and download any file readable by the web server (e.g. configuration.php).

Risk Assessment

An attacker with a valid download token can read arbitrary files readable by the web server, including configuration files with credentials. This can lead to full application compromise and data leakage.

Recommendation

Update the J2Store extension to a version containing the fix. Until patched, consider restricting access to the download functionality and audit the contents of product_file_save_name fields.

Other vulnerabilities in J2Store

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Arbitrary file read via `task=download` in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.2, 4.0.0-4.0.22, 4.1.0-4.1.7 - `J2StoreModelOrderdownloads::getFilePath()` built the on-disk path to a purchased digital download by concatenating the configured attachment folder with the product file's stored `product_file_save_name`, using only `JPath::clean()` (which normalises separators but does not resolve or reject `..` segments) and a plain `JFile::exists()` check — never confirming the resolved path stayed inside the configured attachment folder. If a product file's `product_file_save_name` ever contained a `../` traversal segment — most plausibly via the CSRF-forgeable admin product-file save actions described in Issue 1, but equally by any future integration or bug that writes that field — any customer holding a valid download `token`/`pid` pair for that product file could have the traversal resolve to a path outside the attachment folder and download any file readable by the web server (e.g. `configuration.php`).

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS