CVE-2026-81567

Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Guest checkout address disclosure to any authenticated user (IDOR) in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.21, 4.0.0-4.0.21, 4.1.0-4.1.6 - `editAddress()` redirected non-owners away only when the loaded address row had a **non-empty** `user_id` belonging to someone else. Guest-checkout address rows have an empty `user_id`, so that check never triggered for them — any logged-in account guessing a small, sequential `address_id` got a guest customer's full name, street address, and phone number rendered prefilled into the edit form.

Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Anonymous cart-record tampering via inherited FOF `save` task in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.21, 4.0.0-4.0.21, 4.1.0-4.1.6 - `fof.xml` grants the `carts` view's tasks a wildcard `true` ACL, and FOF only enforces CSRF tokens on back-end HTML requests, not on front-end `format=raw` requests. `J2StoreControllerCarts` already scoped `remove()` to the caller's own session, but never overrode the generic FOF `save` task, so it remained reachable to insert new cart rows with an attacker-chosen `user_id`/`session_id`, or overwrite an existing row by id.

Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Reflected XSS via `filter_tag`, `pricefrom` and `priceto` in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.21, 4.0.0-4.0.21, 4.1.0-4.1.6 - Four task handlers accepted a base64-encoded URL from user input and redirected to it without validating the destination host, enabling phishing using the shop's trusted domain. No authentication required.

Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Unauthenticated PayPal callback forgery leading to order confirmation fraud in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.21, 4.0.0-4.0.21, 4.1.0-4.1.6 - The PayPal IPN listener's signature check (`_validateIPN()`) accepted `UNVERIFIED` and any non-`INVALID` response as valid, made its verification request with `CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER` disabled, and stored its verdict in a field nothing downstream ever checked — so processing continued regardless of the outcome. Separately, the paid-amount comparison only ran when `mc_gross` was a positive number; omitting the field from the POST body (`floatval(null) == 0`) skipped the check entirely. Combined with a merchant-configured `receiver_email` and a sequential, enumerable order id read from the `custom` field, an anonymous POST was enough to move a pending order straight to `CONFIRMED` with no payment, or force another customer's pending order to `FAILED`. `paypalv2.php` performed no amount check under any circumstances.

Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Missing authorization on Apps controller delegation chain in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.21, 4.0.0-4.0.21, 4.1.0-4.1.6 - J2StoreControllerApps's appTask delegation path instantiates app-plugin controllers with no ACL check anywhere in the code. Additionally, applocalizationdata::getInstallerTool() used a caller-influenced table name with no allow-list, enabling path-traversal-capable file read/execute.

Joomla Extension J2Store in versions 1.0.0-3.3.2, 4.0.0-4.0.22, 4.1.0-4.1.7 reflects unescaped request data into the PayPal notify redirect. A crafted link to the paypal notify endpoint, if followed by a victim's browser, causes the redirect to com_j2store's checkout controller to carry attacker-chosen query parameters.

Joomla Extension J2Store in versions 1.0.0-3.3.2, 4.0.0-4.0.22, 4.1.0-4.1.7 uses a predictable/forgeable order access token. Anyone who obtains the site's Joomla secret can compute a valid access token for any order without placing one, gaining guest access to order details and digital downloads.

In the Joomla extension J2Store, any order can be marked Failed by anyone without authentication. An attacker can mass-fail pending orders to disrupt revenue and force manual reprocessing, or flip already-fulfilled orders back to FAILED to cause operational confusion. Unlike the earlier confirmation-fraud issue, this requires no correct payment amount or transaction data at all.

In the Joomla extension J2Store, J2StoreModelOrderdownloads::getFilePath() built the on-disk path to a purchased digital download by concatenating the configured attachment folder with the product file's stored product_file_save_name, using only JPath::clean() (which normalises separators but does not resolve or reject .. segments) and a plain JFile::exists() check. If a product file's product_file_save_name contained a ../ traversal segment, any customer holding a valid download token/pid pair could have the traversal resolve to a path outside the attachment folder and download any file readable by the web server (e.g. configuration.php).

The Joomla extension J2Store (versions 1.0.0-3.3.2, 4.0.0-4.0.22, 4.1.0-4.1.7) lacks CSRF protection on cart, checkout, and profile controllers. A forged request riding a victim's active session can silently overwrite billing or shipping address before order confirmation, potentially redirecting goods to an attacker-controlled address.