CVE-2026-77240
CriticalCVSS 9.9Summary
WACRM 0.7.0 and earlier has vulnerabilities: row-level security policies allow authenticated users to modify their own role and account ID, enabling privilege escalation and cross-tenant movement. Additionally, match_ai_knowledge_fts and match_ai_knowledge_semantic run as SECURITY DEFINER with no account membership check, allowing non-members to read another tenant's knowledge chunks.
Risk Assessment
An attacker could gain unauthorized access and modify tenant resources or read sensitive knowledge-base data.
Recommendation
Update to a patched version (commit e01f7ed37184f972ace8fb2da5c3e37e56a6050f) and apply the fix immediately.
Other vulnerabilities in WACRM
See all- CVE-2026-77239High
A vulnerability in WACRM (self-hostable CRM template for WhatsApp) in version 0.7.0 and earlier affects flow and automation write routes that authenticate account viewers but do not enforce the agent role before using a service-role database client that bypasses row-level security. A viewer can create, edit, activate, or delete flows and create active automations and trigger outbound WhatsApp actions without the required role.
- CVE-2026-67530Medium
WACRM 0.7.0 and earlier allows an authenticated user with automation privileges to submit an arbitrary webhook URL that the server fetches without SSRF protection, enabling requests to private, loopback, link-local, or cloud metadata addresses.
- CVE-2026-49141High
Authorization bypass vulnerability in the WACRM automation engine prior to commit 73041bf. An authenticated attacker can access and modify contacts belonging to other tenants by supplying an arbitrary caller-controlled contact_id in a POST request without tenant ownership verification. The attacker can exploit a service-role client that bypasses row-level security to modify victim contact fields (name, email, company) across tenant boundaries using only a known contact UUID.
Original NVD description (English source)
WACRM is a self-hostable CRM template for WhatsApp. In version 0.7.0 and earlier, the profiles_update row-level security policy in supabase/migrations/017_account_sharing.sql permits authenticated users to modify their own account_role and account_id, allowing a viewer to self-promote or move into another tenant and then access or modify tenant resources. Separately, match_ai_knowledge_fts and match_ai_knowledge_semantic in supabase/migrations/030_ai_knowledge.sql run as SECURITY DEFINER, accept a caller-controlled p_account_id, and omit an is_account_member check, allowing an authenticated non-member to read another tenant's knowledge-base chunks. This vulnerability is fixed with commit e01f7ed37184f972ace8fb2da5c3e37e56a6050f.