WACRM vulnerabilities

A vulnerability in WACRM (self-hostable CRM template for WhatsApp) in version 0.7.0 and earlier affects flow and automation write routes that authenticate account viewers but do not enforce the agent role before using a service-role database client that bypasses row-level security. A viewer can create, edit, activate, or delete flows and create active automations and trigger outbound WhatsApp actions without the required role.

WACRM 0.7.0 and earlier has vulnerabilities: row-level security policies allow authenticated users to modify their own role and account ID, enabling privilege escalation and cross-tenant movement. Additionally, match_ai_knowledge_fts and match_ai_knowledge_semantic run as SECURITY DEFINER with no account membership check, allowing non-members to read another tenant's knowledge chunks.

WACRM 0.7.0 and earlier allows an authenticated user with automation privileges to submit an arbitrary webhook URL that the server fetches without SSRF protection, enabling requests to private, loopback, link-local, or cloud metadata addresses.

Authorization bypass vulnerability in the WACRM automation engine prior to commit 73041bf. An authenticated attacker can access and modify contacts belonging to other tenants by supplying an arbitrary caller-controlled contact_id in a POST request without tenant ownership verification. The attacker can exploit a service-role client that bypasses row-level security to modify victim contact fields (name, email, company) across tenant boundaries using only a known contact UUID.