CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-7656

HighCVSS 8.1
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.31%

24th percentile - higher than 24% of all known CVEs

Summary

A vulnerability in Zephyr RTOS affects IPv6 Neighbor Discovery handlers. Incorrect boolean logic causes all RFC 4861 validity checks (including the mandatory Hop Limit == 255) to be bypassed when the ICMPv6 code field is 0 (normal for ND). This allows an attacker to inject forged RA/NS/NA messages.

Risk Assessment

An adjacent (or remote, due to Hop Limit bypass) attacker can reconfigure the victim's IPv6 settings, poison the neighbor cache, redirect traffic (MITM), or cause denial of service. DNS servers can also be overridden if CONFIG_NET_IPV6_RA_RDNSS is enabled.

Recommendation

Upgrade Zephyr RTOS to a patched version (later than v4.4.0) immediately. If upgrading is not possible, restrict trust in the local network and consider disabling IPv6 ND handling or filtering ICMPv6 traffic at network boundaries.

Other vulnerabilities in Zephyr RTOS

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

The IPv6 Neighbor Discovery handlers in subsys/net/ip/ipv6_nbr.c (handle_ra_input, handle_ns_input, handle_na_input) used an incorrect boolean expression that combined the RFC 4861 validity checks with the ICMPv6 code check using the wrong operator precedence: the form was ((length/hop/source/target checks) && (icmp_hdr->code != 0)). Because every legitimate ND message carries ICMPv6 code 0, an attacker setting code == 0 (the normal value) caused the entire predicate to evaluate false, so the packet was never dropped and all of the other checks were silently skipped. The bypassed checks include the mandatory Hop Limit == 255 verification (which proves an ND packet originated on-link and was not forwarded) and, for Router Advertisements, the requirement that the source be a link-local address, as well as multicast-target sanity checks. As a result, an adjacent on-link attacker — and, because the Hop-Limit-255 guard is bypassed, potentially a remote/off-link attacker whose packets would otherwise be rejected — can have forged Router Advertisement, Neighbor Solicitation, and Neighbor Advertisement messages accepted. A forged RA lets the attacker reconfigure the victim's default router, on-link prefixes (SLAAC), MTU, reachable/retransmit timers, and (with CONFIG_NET_IPV6_RA_RDNSS) DNS servers, while forged NS/NA enable neighbor-cache poisoning, enabling man-in-the-middle, traffic redirection, and denial of service. The flaw is an input-validation/authentication weakness rather than a memory-safety issue: the underlying packet-parsing primitives (net_pkt_get_data, net_pkt_read, net_pkt_skip) are independently bounds-safe and the validated length is the true buffer length, so skipping the length check causes no out-of-bounds access. The defect has existed since the logic was introduced in 2018 and shipped in all releases through v4.4.0; it is fixed by splitting the condition so any failing check drops the packet.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS