CVE-2026-64046
CriticalCVSS 9.8Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk41th percentile - higher than 41% of all known CVEs
Summary
A vulnerability in the Linux kernel's TLS implementation creates an invalid scatterlist chain when end=0 (start!=0), resulting in a chain-after-chain scenario. This passes illegal input to the crypto layer, potentially causing errors or security breaches.
Risk Assessment
The organization faces unpredictable TLS stack behavior, potentially leading to data leaks or denial of service (DoS) if exploited by an attacker.
Recommendation
Immediately update the Linux kernel to a version containing the fix (commit that prevents chain-after-chain in plain text SG for TLS).
Original NVD description (English source)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: tls: prevent chain-after-chain in plain text SG Sashiko points out that if end = 0 (start != 0) the current code will create a chain link to content type right after the wrap link: This would create a chain where the wrap link points directly to another chain link. The scatterlist API sg_next iterator does not recursively resolve consecutive chain links. meaning this is illegal input to crypto. The wrapping link is unnecessary if end = 0. end is the entry after the last one used so end = 0 means there's nothing pushed after the wrap: end start i v v v [ ]...[ ][ d ][ d ][ d ][ d ][rsv for wrap] Skip the wrapping in this case. TLS 1.3 can use the "wrapping slot" for it's chaining if end = 0. This avoids the chain-after-chain. Move the wrap chaining before marking END and chaining off content type, that feels like more logical ordering to me, but should not matter from functional perspective.