CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-53078

HighCVSS 7.8
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.11%

2th percentile - higher than 2% of all known CVEs

Summary

In the Linux kernel, in BPF sock_ops programs, when the destination register is the same as the source, the SOCK_OPS_GET_SK() and SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() macros fail to zero the destination register in the !fullsock / !locked_tcp_sock path. This leads to stack out-of-bounds read and kernel pointer leak.

Risk Assessment

A local attacker can exploit this vulnerability to read kernel memory out of bounds or leak a kernel pointer, potentially leading to privilege escalation or disclosure of sensitive data.

Recommendation

Apply the Linux kernel patch that adds zeroing of the destination register in the !fullsock path of the SOCK_OPS_GET_SK and SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD macros.

Other vulnerabilities in Linux kernel

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Original NVD description (English source)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix same-register dst/src OOB read and pointer leak in sock_ops When a BPF sock_ops program accesses ctx fields with dst_reg == src_reg, the SOCK_OPS_GET_SK() and SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() macros fail to zero the destination register in the !fullsock / !locked_tcp_sock path. Both macros borrow a temporary register to check is_fullsock / is_locked_tcp_sock when dst_reg == src_reg, because dst_reg holds the ctx pointer. When the check is false (e.g., TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV state with a request_sock), dst_reg should be zeroed but is not, leaving the stale ctx pointer: - SOCK_OPS_GET_SK: dst_reg retains the ctx pointer, passes NULL checks as PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL, and can be used as a bogus socket pointer, leading to stack-out-of-bounds access in helpers like bpf_skc_to_tcp6_sock(). - SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD: dst_reg retains the ctx pointer which the verifier believes is a SCALAR_VALUE, leaking a kernel pointer. Fix both macros by: - Changing JMP_A(1) to JMP_A(2) in the fullsock path to skip the added instruction. - Adding BPF_MOV64_IMM(si->dst_reg, 0) after the temp register restore in the !fullsock path, placed after the restore because dst_reg == src_reg means we need src_reg intact to read ctx->temp.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS