CVE-2026-19991
HighCVSS 8.1Summary
The UsersWP plugin for WordPress (versions up to and including 1.2.70) is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion via the upload_file_remove() AJAX handler. An authenticated attacker with Subscriber-level access or above can delete arbitrary files on the server, including wp-config.
Risk Assessment
An attacker with low privileges can delete critical files such as wp-config.php, potentially leading to complete site destruction or data exposure.
Recommendation
Update the plugin to a version newer than 1.2.70 or disable it if no fix is available.
Other vulnerabilities in UsersWP
See all- CVE-2026-18501Medium
The UsersWP – Front-end login form, User Registration, User Profile & Members Directory plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via Badge Widget Variable Substitution in all versions up to and including 1.2.69 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.
- CVE-2026-13492High
The UsersWP plugin for WordPress up to version 1.2.65 is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion. This is due to insufficient validation of file fields in the UsersWP_Validation::validate_fields() function and lack of path canonicalization in the UsersWP_Forms::upload_file_remove() AJAX handler, allowing deletion of any file on the server.
Original NVD description (English source)
The UsersWP plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion in versions up to, and including, 1.2.70 via the upload_file_remove() AJAX handler. The plugin stores the value of an account 'file' form field taken directly from $_POST when no real $_FILES upload is provided (process_account() calls uwp_validate_fields() and array_merges the result with the empty output of UsersWP_Files::validate_uploads()). At storage time the value is only checked with validate_file(), which passes any string that does not contain a literal '../'. When the value is later processed by upload_file_remove(), it is again gated with validate_file() and then normalized through uwp_get_file_relative_url(); that helper performs a global str_replace() of the uploads base URL against the stored URL, allowing a crafted URL containing embedded '..<uploads-baseurl>' tokens to collapse into '../../' traversal sequences after the last validation. The transformed value is then appended to the uploads base directory and passed to wp_delete_file() without any canonical containment check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the affected site's server (including wp-config.