CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-102713

HighCVSS 8.8
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Summary

The TFTP server does not enforce an upper bound on DATA datagram size, accepting packets larger than the protocol maximum. This leads to a heap-buffer-overflow when copying data into FileX, enabling memory disclosure, and also allows an attacker to wedge the server thread by exhausting the packet pool. Both issues are reachable without authentication since TFTP has none.

Risk Assessment

An attacker can read sensitive data from server memory and permanently hang the TFTP service, blocking all subsequent clients. In industrial or embedded environments this may cause disruption of critical services.

Recommendation

Update the software to a version that rejects datagrams larger than 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX in the DATA branch and replaces NX_WAIT_FOREVER with a bounded wait. If updating is not possible, consider disabling or restricting access to the TFTP service.

Related vulnerabilities

Original NVD description (English source)

The TFTP server accepts a DATA datagram of any size. The dispatcher rejects datagrams shorter than four bytes (nxd_tftp_server.c:1037) and nothing anywhere checks an upper bound, in particular not against the protocol maximum of 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX. Two things follow from that one missing check, both reachable before any authentication because TFTP has none. The handler passes `nx_packet_length - 4` straight to FileX: ```c /* addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_server.c:1863, 1889 */ status = nx_packet_copy(packet_ptr, &temp_ptr, server_ptr -> nx_tftp_server_packet_pool_ptr, NX_WAIT_FOREVER); ... fx_file_write(&(client_request_ptr -> nx_tftp_client_request_file), packet_ptr -> nx_packet_prepend_ptr + 4, packet_ptr -> nx_packet_length - 4); ``` `nx_packet_length` is the length of a chain, not of one contiguous buffer, so FileX copies past the end of the first packet: ``` ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow READ of size 1280 at 0x621000001108 thread T5 #0 __interceptor_memcpy #1 _fx_utility_memory_copy filex/common/src/fx_utility_memory_copy.c:78 0x621000001108 is 0 bytes to the right of 4104-byte region ``` Those bytes are written into the file the attacker is uploading, and a TFTP read request hands them back, so this is a memory disclosure with a convenient retrieval channel. The same datagram also wedges the server. `nx_packet_copy` at :1863 needs ceil(nx_packet_length / pool_payload) packets and asks for them with NX_WAIT_FOREVER, so when the attacker sizes the datagram beyond what the pool holds, the server thread suspends and never returns. A liveness probe after one such datagram times out with the pool at 0 of 12 packets and the server thread suspended, and no later client is served. Reject `nx_packet_length > 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX` in the DATA branch before either call, and use a bounded wait rather than NX_WAIT_FOREVER for the copy.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS