CVE-2025-61260

OpenAI Codex CLI for Windows, macOS, and Linux and Codex Desktop for Windows and macOS automatically collected Git repository metadata without disabling the repository-local core.fsmonitor setting. If a user opens or uses an attacker-prepared repository whose preserved .git/config sets core.fsmonitor to an attacker-controlled filesystem-monitor helper, Git can execute that helper while Codex collects repository metadata. The helper runs outside Codex's command sandbox and without a user-approval prompt, allowing attacker-controlled code to run with the user's privileges. The code can read, change, or delete the user's files and access other resources available to the user's account. An ordinary Git clone does not preserve the source repository's local .git/config; exploitation requires a repository delivered or copied with that configuration intact.

OpenAI Codex CLI for Windows, macOS, and Linux and Codex Desktop for Windows and macOS misclassified certain PowerShell commands as safe because their command-safety parser interpreted PowerShell's stop-parsing token (--%) differently than PowerShell itself. If a user opens an attacker-prepared repository and Codex follows its instructions, Codex can run a file-writing Git command without requesting user approval. On macOS and Linux, exploitation additionally requires separately installed PowerShell Core (pwsh) to be invoked. If filesystem protections permit the write, the command can modify Codex's configuration. If Codex later loads the modified configuration, it can launch an attacker-controlled MCP server and execute code with the user's privileges, allowing it to read, change, or delete files accessible to that account. The approval bypass does not disable filesystem sandboxing; the default filesystem sandbox on macOS and Linux can prevent writes outside permitted locations.