CVE Catalog

CVE-2025-12999

CriticalCVSS 9.1
Published: Translated: NVD NIST

Summary

A vulnerability in Open VSX allows an unauthenticated attacker to poison the per-extension metadata cache by supplying a crafted X-Forwarded-Host header, replacing download, signature, and public-key URLs with attacker-controlled ones. The cache keys do not include the host, so poisoned entries are served to all clients for the entry's lifetime (1 hour by default, cluster-wide with Redis).

Risk Assessment

An attacker can cause VS Code-compatible editors to fetch and install a malicious VSIX, leading to arbitrary code execution in development environments. Extension signing does not limit the impact because the attacker supplies the package, signature, and verification key.

Recommendation

Configure the reverse proxy to overwrite X-Forwarded-Host, X-Forwarded-Proto, and X-Forwarded-Prefix headers instead of relaying client values. Ensure the server is only reachable through the proxy, and flush caches after configuration changes to remove poisoned entries.

Related vulnerabilities

Original NVD description (English source)

UrlUtil.getBaseUrl builds the absolute URLs in a response — download links, icons, asset and API URLs — from the X-Forwarded-Host, X-Forwarded-Proto and X-Forwarded-Prefix request headers, with no check on whether the sender was a trusted proxy, falling back to the client-supplied Host header. Those responses are cached under keys that do not include the host (extension.json since 0.6.0, namespace.details.json since 0.9.0, sitemap since 0.14.5, latest.extension.version.vscode since 0.34.2). A single request carrying a forged header therefore places attacker-chosen URLs into an entry served to every other client for the lifetime of that entry — one hour by default, and cluster-wide where ovsx.redis.enabled is set. The VSIX download URL, its signature URL and the public key URL are all derived from the same base URL, so extension signing does not limit the impact: an attacker who poisons an entry supplies the package, the signature over it, and the key used to verify it. Exploitability depends on deployment topology. A server reachable directly by clients, or fronted by a proxy that relays the client's X-Forwarded-Host rather than overwriting it, is exploitable by an unauthenticated remote attacker. A proxy that overwrites the header is not. An unauthenticated attacker can poison Open VSX's per-extension metadata cache with attacker-controlled download, signature, and public-key URLs by supplying a crafted X-Forwarded-Host header, causing downstream VS Code-compatible editors to fetch and install a malicious VSIX. Workarounds (unpatched versions) 1. Configure the reverse proxy to set rather than relay X-Forwarded-Host, X-Forwarded-Proto and X-Forwarded-Prefix — note that nginx's $host is the client's Host header and is not a safe value. 2. Ensure the server is not reachable except through that proxy. 3. Flush the caches afterwards; poisoned entries survive the configuration change.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS