CVE Vulnerability Catalog

GitLab EE contains a vulnerability that allows an authenticated user with Duo Chat access to obtain Advanced Search instance configurations and sensitive credentials. The attacker uses a specially crafted GraphQL subscription argument to bypass serialization and perform server object lookup.

aiosmtplib before 5.1.3 fails to properly validate email addresses supplied by callers, allowing attackers to inject ESMTP parameters into MAIL FROM and RCPT TO command lines. Attackers can craft malicious addresses containing spaces and angle brackets to append parameters like AUTH, NOTIFY, or ORCPT to envelope commands, forging authenticated identities or forcing delivery notifications to third parties.

QloApps through 1.7.0 renders back-office list filter POST parameters into HTML input value attributes without escaping them in the list helper template. Attackers can induce authenticated users to submit crafted POST requests with malicious payloads to list controllers, executing arbitrary JavaScript in the victim's session to read administrative data and perform actions.

starlette-admin versions 0.16.1 through 0.17.1 fail to enforce the searchable_fields allowlist when configured as an empty list, allowing authenticated users to filter on non-searchable fields. Attackers can submit structured filter queries via the list API's where parameter to perform equality and comparison operations on excluded columns.

stb_vorbis through 1.22 contains a heap buffer overflow in start_decoder() where the codebook multiplicands allocation size is truncated from size_t to int. Attackers can craft a malicious Ogg Vorbis file with large entries and dimensions values to trigger out-of-bounds writes, causing process crashes or heap corruption.

OpenStack Ironic through version 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication. Credentials may leak to an unintended recipient.

In OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3, tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project.

The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path.

An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.

A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library.

A deployment mode intended to expose only read access to a bundled packet-analysis component's interface denies a list of write-capable routes by pattern, but the pattern omits routes that modify tags attached to stored session records. The proxy configuration otherwise permits the request method those routes use.

A file-upload handler redirects the authenticated client's browser to a URL taken directly from that same request's Referer header, without validating it against the application's own origin. This allows an authenticated attacker to craft a request that causes another user's browser to be redirected to an arbitrary external destination after completing an upload.

Requests from the reverse proxy to the identity-provider service for token discovery, introspection, and credential exchange do not verify the identity provider's server certificate. An attacker positioned on the network path between the proxy and the identity provider could impersonate the identity provider and issue forged authentication tokens accepted by the deployment.

An example environment-configuration file ships with a fixed, publicly-known secret value used to sign authentication cookies for a bundled packet-analysis component. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates the value will use the known default.

The role-authorization lookup defaults to granting access when a request handler's name is absent from the role requirements table, instead of defaulting to deny. Any handler not explicitly registered is reachable by any authenticated user regardless of role, and newly added handlers are fail-open by default.

In a particular authentication mode, the reverse proxy forwards requests for a bundled third-party administrative interface directly to it without first applying the gateway's own authentication requirement. All access control for this interface, which manages the credential store gating every other service, is delegated entirely to the third-party login mechanism.

A deployment mode intended to expose only read access to stored data proxies a set of API routes without restricting which request methods are allowed. One such route accepts a request that creates or overwrites a stored record, including an attacker-chosen identifier, using the application's own elevated backend credentials.

A routing rule selects between two different authentication mechanisms for the same downstream service based on the value of a client-supplied request header, rather than on any property the client cannot control. An authenticated user in possession of a shared service credential can set this header to route around the primary role-based authorization check and reach the alternate path's fixed, elevated role.

An API endpoint accepts a user-supplied value and interpolates it directly into the path of a backend request to the underlying search and analytics data store, without restricting its contents. This allows an authenticated attacker to substitute an arbitrary backend path, causing the application's elevated service credentials to be used against unintended internal endpoints.