CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-99226

Unknown
Published: Translated: NVD NIST

Summary

A use-after-free flaw was fixed in the Linux kernel's find_keyring_by_name() during named keyring lookup. The function read keyring->user->uid under keyring_name_lock, which does not protect the separate key_user object, so a concurrent KEYCTL_CHOWN could free the old key_user between the pointer load and the UID read. The fix uses the inline keyring->uid field instead of dereferencing the owner account.

Risk Assessment

A local attacker can trigger a read of freed memory (use-after-free) by racing a named keyring join with KEYCTL_CHOWN, potentially leading to data disclosure or kernel instability (panic).

Recommendation

Update the Linux kernel to a version containing the fix for CVE-2026-99226 and deploy it on all systems, especially multiprocessor hosts where concurrent keyring operations are possible.

Other vulnerabilities in Linux kernel

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Original NVD description (English source)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: keys: Avoid the owner account dereference in named keyring lookup Named keyring lookup must keep the storage containing the owner UID alive through the namespace mapping check. find_keyring_by_name() reads keyring->user->uid under keyring_name_lock, but that lock protects the keyring's name entry and allocation, not its separate key_user. A named session-keyring join can overlap a privileged KEYCTL_CHOWN on another CPU. If the keyring holds the last reference to its old dynamic key_user and the ownership transfer succeeds, the following ordering is possible: Named join Chown find_keyring_by_name() keyctl_chown_key() read_lock(keyring_name_lock) down_write(key->sem) load old keyring->user replace key->user and key->uid up_write(key->sem) key_put(key) key_user_put(old user): free read old user->uid read_unlock(keyring_name_lock) Chown neither takes keyring_name_lock nor key_session_mutex, so it can free the old account between the pointer load and the UID read. The lookup then reads freed memory even though the keyring itself is alive. Use keyring->uid for the mapping check. key_alloc() initializes this inline owner UID and keyctl_chown_key() updates it on chown. The existing name lock keeps its containing keyring allocated throughout the check, so lookup no longer depends on the account's lifetime. This also matches the owner UID used by the permission check. KASAN report as below: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in find_keyring_by_name+0x577/0x5d0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881128ae2ec by task keycase/500

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS