CVE-2026-99223
UnknownSummary
In the Linux kernel, keyring indexes contained kernel addresses (hashes of type and domain pointers), allowing an unprivileged user to predict key ordering and recover the kernel image address, defeating KASLR. The fix removes addresses from the entire index, replacing them with lazily allocated 64-bit IDs hashed with a SipHash key.
Risk Assessment
Disclosure of the kernel image address significantly eases exploitation of other kernel vulnerabilities (KASLR bypass). The risk applies to systems where unprivileged users can create keys.
Recommendation
Update the Linux kernel to a version containing the fix. Until then, restrict the ability of unprivileged users to create keyrings where feasible.
Other vulnerabilities in Linux kernel
See all- CVE-2026-58942High
In do_fault_around of memory.c, there is a possible use after free due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed.
- CVE-2026-58847Unknown
In kvm_vfio_pviommu_attach of vfio.c, there is a possible double free due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.
- CVE-2026-58829High
In fuse_backing_mmap of backing.c, there is a possible memory corruption due to a use after free. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed.
- CVE-2026-58828High
In multiple functions of base.c, there is a possible use-after-free due to a race condition. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed.
- CVE-2026-58827High
In multiple functions of dma-buf.c, there is a possible use after free due to a race condition. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed.
- CVE-2026-58826High
In ksys_unshare of fork.c, there is a possible memory corruption due to a use after free. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed.
- CVE-2026-58825High
In multiple functions of fork.c, there is a possible use after free due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed.
- CVE-2026-99242Unknown
In the Linux kernel, a race between fallocate and mmap reads in NTFS was fixed. Fallocate only took invalidate_lock for punch hole, collapse range and insert range operations, and during standard allocation new clusters were mapped before being zeroed, allowing concurrent mmap page faults to read uninitialized disk data.
- CVE-2026-99241Unknown
In the Linux kernel, a missing lock in ntfs_filemap_page_mkwrite() was fixed; it called iomap_page_mkwrite() without holding mapping->invalidate_lock. A concurrent truncate or fallocate could be invalidating pagecache and rewriting the runlist while the write fault mapped blocks and dirtied the folio.
- CVE-2026-99240Unknown
In the Linux kernel, the DAMON subsystem (mm/damon/core) has a division-by-zero bug when a DAMOS quota goal has a target_value of zero. The fix moves handling of this corner case to the core layer by adding validation in damos_commit_quota_goal(), which now returns an error for zero target values.
Original NVD description (English source)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: keys: make keyring indexes independent of kernel addresses KEYCTL_READ returns the serial numbers in a keyring in associative-array traversal order. The first word of the index is a public, deterministic hash of the type pointer, domain pointer and description. An unprivileged user can therefore insert keys with known descriptions, predict their order for each possible KASLR slide, and recover the kernel image address. On an x86-64 build with 16 MiB alignment, 45 user keys suffice to distinguish the candidate slides. Remove the addresses from the whole index, not just its first hash word. Assign each key type and domain a nonzero 64-bit ID and hash those IDs and the description with a once-initialized SipHash key. Use the full IDs in the later index chunks as well. Truncating or hashing the IDs there would lose the guarantee that distinct type/domain/description tuples have a differing index bit. Allocate IDs lazily since private key types need not be registered. Cache them in the index key so tree walks and copies of an existing index do not need to dereference a type descriptor that may have been unregistered. Keep the 32-bit chunk layout and diff_objects() bit offsets consistent, and retain the separate root slot for keyrings used by recursive search. The key comparison, permissions and userspace data format are unchanged; only the address-dependent in-memory ordering is replaced.
Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS