CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-99112

HighCVSS 7.1
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.19%

8th percentile - higher than 8% of all known CVEs

Summary

In the Linux kernel, net/sched: cls_flower has a mask pointer validation flaw after nla_next(). fl_set_enc_opt() iterates the key's nested tunnel-option attributes while advancing a single mask pointer via nla_next() based on the number of key attributes rather than the mask's own attributes; the pointer produced by nla_next() is used in the next iteration without validation, leading to an out-of-bounds read (slab-out-of-bounds) in __nla_validate_parse called from fl_change().

Risk Assessment

The vulnerability can be triggered by a local user to cause an out-of-bounds read in kernel memory (KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds read), potentially leading to data disclosure or system destabilization (denial of service).

Recommendation

Update the Linux kernel to a version containing the fix that validates the advanced mask pointer after nla_next() (rejecting the filter with -EINVAL when msk_depth != 0 and the new pointer fails nla_ok()).

Other vulnerabilities in Linux kernel

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Original NVD description (English source)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_flower: validate mask pointer after nla_next() fl_set_enc_opt() iterates the key's nested tunnel-option attributes with nla_for_each_attr() while advancing a single mask pointer via nla_next() at the bottom of each loop, so the mask cursor is driven by the number of key attributes rather than by the mask's own attributes. The nla_ok() added by commit c96adff956191 ("cls_flower: call nla_ok() before nla_next()") only validates the mask pointer that was just consumed; the pointer produced by nla_next() is used by the next iteration (fl_set_geneve_opt() and siblings) without any validation. The mask's nested attributes are validated with NL_VALIDATE_LIBERAL, which merely warns on trailing bytes that do not form a complete attribute. A mask carrying one valid attribute plus 1-3 residue bytes (or a non-aligned attribute length making msk_depth negative) therefore reaches the next iteration with msk_depth != 0, so neither the !msk_depth check in fl_set_enc_opt() nor the !depth check in the per-type helpers fires. nla_type() then reads past the mask payload and nla_parse_nested_deprecated() iterates with an nla_len taken from those bytes, reading well beyond the mask attribute (KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds read in __nla_validate_parse from fl_change()). Validate the advanced mask pointer as well: when the mask is not legitimately exhausted (msk_depth != 0) and the new pointer fails nla_ok(), reject the filter with -EINVAL. An exactly exhausted mask still skips the check, preserving exact-match behaviour for the remaining key attributes.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS