CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-98976

HighCVSS 7.8
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.20%

9th percentile - higher than 9% of all known CVEs

Summary

A vulnerability in the Linux kernel mount namespace handling was fixed. attach_recursive_mnt() transferred the MNT_LOCKED flag from the top mount to a mount moved beneath it, allowing a user namespace owner to unlock and unmount a protected /proc or root mount, exposing hidden data.

Risk Assessment

A local user with privileges in a user namespace can bypass the mount lock mechanism and access data that should remain hidden (e.g., /proc contents or the root directory). This may lead to information disclosure or privilege escalation in containerized environments.

Recommendation

Update the Linux kernel to a version containing the fix. Prioritize the update in environments using containers and unprivileged user namespaces.

Other vulnerabilities in Linux kernel

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: keep the lock on a mount that a propagated copy is moved beneath attach_recursive_mnt() transfers MNT_LOCKED from the top mount to the mount that is moved beneath it with MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH. This allows the owner of a user namespace to replace its locked /proc or its root. The mount beneath takes on the job of covering the underlying mountpoint allowing the top mount to be unmounted. Consider two mount namespaces: (H) The host H has a shared mount P with a secret in P/d (Z) Z is a user namespace made from M. Its copy of P receives propagation from the host's P and its copy of M's cover on P/d is locked Z's owner must not get to see P/d. Now (H) mounts X on P/d. This propagates into (Z). The copy of X lands beneath (Z)'s locked cover. The locked property is transfered from (Z)'s cover to the copy of X propagated beneath it. The cover is now unlocked. Now (H) unmounts X again. The copy of X in (Z) gets unmounted and the covering mount is left unlocked on top of P/d. (Z) can now unmount it: Z: umount2(P/d) = EINVAL /* the cover is locked */ H: mount X on P/d, umount X /* both propagate into Z /* Z: umount2(P/d) = 0 /* the cover is now unlocked */ Z: read P/d/secret = "covered-by-root" /* secret revealed */ So only transfer the locked property to the mount beneath for mounts the caller has placed. A propagated copy that lands beneath a locked mount is locked as well so that the mount at the bottom of the stack carries a lock the way every check expects. The mount on top of it remains locked to ensure that it keeps covering even if the propagated mount is unmounted again.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS