CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-98406

Unknown
Published: Translated: NVD NIST

Summary

In the Linux kernel, ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() lacked a check for the IEEE80211_SDATA_IN_DRIVER flag before calling the driver. When the interface was running but not yet added to the driver (e.g., during bringup or teardown), an ioctl SIOCSIWRATE call triggered a WARN in driver-ops.h. The fix adds an IN_DRIVER check and returns -ENETDOWN.

Risk Assessment

The vulnerability can be triggered locally by a user with access to the network interface, causing a kernel WARN and potential system destabilization. In multi-user or automated environments, it may disrupt wireless network operation.

Recommendation

Update the Linux kernel to a version containing the fix for CVE-2026-98406. If immediate update is not possible, restrict access to wireless interfaces and SIOCSIWRATE ioctl operations for untrusted users.

Other vulnerabilities in Linux kernel

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Original NVD description (English source)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: avoid WARN in set_bitrate_mask when sdata not in driver ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() checks if the interface is running via ieee80211_sdata_running(), but it does not check if the interface is still present in the driver. When sdata is running but IEEE80211_SDATA_IN_DRIVER is not set, the call reaches drv_set_bitrate_mask() in driver-ops.h which hits wlan1: Failed check-sdata-in-driver check, flags: 0x0 WARNING: net/mac80211/driver-ops.h:884 at drv_set_bitrate_mask Syzkaller triggers this via wext SIOCSIWRATE ioctl. The Call Trace shows wext_ioctl_dispatch() in wext-core.c dispatching the ioctl, calling ioctl_standard_call() for SIOCSIWRATE, which calls cfg80211_wext_siwrate() in wext-compat.c. That builds a bitrate mask and calls rdev_set_bitrate_mask() which ends up in ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() in cfg.c. The interface is marked running via SDATA_STATE_RUNNING but flags is 0, so check_sdata_in_driver() fails. When the interface is being torn down, or when wext ioctl is issued during interface bringup before drv_add_interface() sets IN_DRIVER, the running check passes while IN_DRIVER is clear. Check IEEE80211_SDATA_IN_DRIVER in ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() before calling the driver, returning -ENETDOWN. This avoids the WARN_ONCE in driver-ops.h and matches other cfg.c operations that bail early when not in driver. This change should be safe because wiphy mutex is held in cfg80211_wext_siwrate() via guard(wiphy), and IN_DRIVER is set/cleared under RTNL and wiphy paths in drv_add_interface() and drv_remove_interface() in driver-ops.c, so the check is race-free against driver add/remove. Returning -ENETDOWN is the same error other not-running paths use and does not introduce new locking. [also add second syzbot report]

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS