CVE-2026-91006
UnknownSummary
Apache Karaf's instance-management service (InstanceServiceImpl) builds the command line used to launch a child Karaf JVM by string concatenation, then executes it through /bin/sh (Unix) or cscript (Windows). The caller-supplied javaOpts value is spliced into that string unquoted, allowing shell metacharacters (;, |, `, $(...)) to be interpreted by the shell, leading to arbitrary OS command execution as the Karaf process user.
Risk Assessment
An attacker can gain full control over the system running Karaf by executing arbitrary commands, potentially compromising confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data and the entire infrastructure.
Recommendation
Apply mitigations: set karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin in etc/system.properties, restrict access to instance:* commands and InstancesMBean via role assignments in etc/users.properties, and treat javaOpts passed to instance:create/instance:start/instance:change-opts/InstancesMBean as untrusted input from fully-trusted operators only.
Other vulnerabilities in Apache Karaf
See all- CVE-2026-92142Unknown
Apache Karaf has a vulnerability in JMX MBeanServer security, where createMBean, registerMBean, and unregisterMBean operations are not subject to RBAC. This allows a user with the 'viewer' role to achieve remote code execution in the Karaf JVM by using MLet as a remote classloader.
- CVE-2026-91085Unknown
Apache Karaf's config:install command is not covered by any ACL rule and is therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one with only the viewer role. The command fetches a file from an arbitrary URL and writes it into karaf.etc, which contains security-relevant files such as users.properties, keys.properties, host.key, and all ACL configuration files. With the --override flag, existing files can be overwritten, and Felix FileInstall automatically reloads changed .cfg files without requiring a restart.
- CVE-2026-91048Unknown
A vulnerability in Apache Karaf is due to the lack of an ACL configuration file for jdbc and jms commands, allowing any authenticated shell session (even with the viewer role) to execute all jdbc:* and jms:* commands. The jdbc:ds-create command allows storing an arbitrary JDBC URL, which can lead to code execution at the connection level, bypassing the admin role gate.
- CVE-2026-91012Unknown
A vulnerability in Apache Karaf allows a user with the "manager" role to write arbitrary content to any file the Karaf process can write to. This is achieved by bypassing path checks in ConfigRepositoryImpl.update() and createFactoryConfiguration(), where the felix.fileinstall.filename value or a PID with ".." segments can point outside the ${karaf.etc} directory.
- CVE-2026-92230High
Apache Karaf's XmlUtils cached XML parser/transformer factories in static ThreadLocal fields on long-lived container threads. Because a ThreadLocal value outlives the OSGi bundle that created it, repeated bundle or feature install, update, or refresh operations can leave successive bundle ClassLoader's pinned in memory and unreachable for garbage collection, leading to unbounded Metaspace growth and eventual denial of service of the Karaf instance.
Original NVD description (English source)
Apache Karaf's instance-management service (InstanceServiceImpl) builds the command line used to launch a child Karaf JVM by string concatenation, then executes it through /bin/sh (Unix) or cscript (Windows). The caller-supplied javaOpts value is spliced into that string unquoted. A javaOpts value containing shell metacharacters (;, |, `, $(...)) is interpreted by the shell instead of being passed to the JVM as an option, giving arbitrary OS command execution as the Karaf process user. Reachable via the shell commands instance:create, instance:start, instance:restart, instance:change-opts, and the equivalent InstanceMBean JMX operations (createInstance, startInstance, changeJavaOpts, cloneInstance). Mitigation * Set karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin in etc/system.properties to close the fail-open gap for all unconfigured command scopes. * Restrict which principals can reach instance:* commands and InstancesMBean via etc/users.properties role assignments. * Treat javaOpts passed to instance:create/instance:start/instance:change-opts/InstancesMBean as untrusted input only from fully-trusted operators.
Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS