CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-90058

Unknown
Published: Translated: NVD NIST

Summary

Vulnerability in the Linux kernel net/sched component allows causing a soft lockup via crafted size table (stab) in DRR and ETS schedulers. An attacker with CAP_NET_ADMIN in a namespace can trigger a huge qdisc_pkt_len value (~1 GiB), leading to a loop in the scheduler and system hang.

Risk Assessment

The attack can lead to system hang (soft lockup/RCU stall), causing denial of service. It requires local access with admin privileges in a namespace, but can be performed by an unprivileged user in a fresh user+net namespace.

Recommendation

Apply the official Linux kernel patch that caps qdisc_pkt_len to QDISC_PKT_LEN_MAX (1 MiB). If immediate update is not possible, restrict configuration of DRR and ETS schedulers for unprivileged users or limit access to network namespaces.

Other vulnerabilities in Linux kernel

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Original NVD description (English source)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: bound qdisc_pkt_len to prevent qdisc soft lockup qdisc_get_stab() accepts a user-supplied size table, and __qdisc_calculate_pkt_len() amplifies qdisc_pkt_len() through the overhead, the size-table data (u16), and size_log (up to STAB_SIZE_LOG_MAX). A crafted stab can therefore set qdisc_pkt_len() to ~1 GiB for an ordinary skb. Per-flow deficit schedulers such as DRR and ETS replenish one quantum per loop iteration; with a tiny quantum (1) they spin billions of times under the qdisc lock, producing a soft lockup / RCU stall as illustrated by [email protected]. Cap the final qdisc_pkt_len() to QDISC_PKT_LEN_MAX so the size-table amplification cannot drive deficit schedulers into an unbounded loop. A legitimate size table (e.g. qfq's overhead 999999999, which is handled by dropping) is still accepted. Introduce cap QDISC_PKT_LEN_MAX (1 << 20) = 1 MiB which is well above any legitimate single-skb wire length: the largest current skb->len is GSO_MAX_SIZE (524280), and an ATM-style size table (53/48 cell tax) amplifies that to ~578 KB, both comfortably below 1 MiB. At the same time, 1 MiB bounds the deficit refill loop to ~1M iterations per packet with quantum=1, which completes in a few milliseconds well under the demonstrated softlockup threshold (~10^9 iterations). Conditions to recreate the bug: - CONFIG_NET_SCHED=y, CONFIG_NET_SCH_DRR=y (or CONFIG_NET_SCH_ETS=y). - Attach a DRR (or ETS) root qdisc with a crafted TCA_STAB that amplifies qdisc_pkt_len to ~1 GiB (e.g. size_log=15, data=[32768]). - Add a class with a tiny quantum of 1 and send one small packet; the deficit loop spins billions of times under the qdisc lock and trips the softlockup detector (panic with kernel.softlockup_panic=1). - Reachable as root or from an unprivileged user in a fresh user+net namespace (unshare -Urn) with namespace-local CAP_NET_ADMIN.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS