CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-89655

CriticalCVSS 9.8
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.20%

10th percentile - higher than 10% of all known CVEs

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the __kick_flushing_caps() function in the ceph module contains a use-after-free vulnerability. The function iterates over the i_cap_flush_list but drops the i_ceph_lock while sending cap messages, allowing handle_cap_flush_ack() to free a cf entry that the original thread later dereferences after reacquiring the lock.

Risk Assessment

This can lead to kernel memory corruption, system crash (panic), or potential arbitrary code execution with kernel privileges. It affects systems using the Ceph client in the Linux kernel.

Recommendation

Update the Linux kernel to a version containing the fix that converts the list_for_each_entry() loop to a manual while loop saving the next pointer before dropping the lock. If updating is not possible, consider limiting the use of the in-kernel Ceph client.

Other vulnerabilities in Linux kernel

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Original NVD description (English source)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fix UAF in __kick_flushing_caps() on cf entry freed during unlock list_for_each_entry() iterates ci->i_cap_flush_list but drops i_ceph_lock to send cap messages. During the unlock window, handle_cap_flush_ack() can acquire i_ceph_lock, detach cf entries with tid <= flush_tid from the list, release i_ceph_lock, and free them via ceph_free_cap_flush() outside any lock. When the original thread reacquires i_ceph_lock and the for-loop macro advances via cf = list_next_entry(cf, i_list), it dereferences cf->i_list.next on freed memory. The race timeline: __kick_flushing_caps() handle_cap_flush_ack() ----------------------- ----------------------- holds i_ceph_lock <--- iterates to cf (tid=10) prepares FLUSH message drops i_ceph_lock <--- __send_cap() ── FLUSH(tid=10) MDS sends FLUSH_ACK(tid=10) ---> acquires i_ceph_lock cf->tid(10) <= flush_tid(10), detaches cf from i_cap_flush_list drops i_ceph_lock ceph_free_cap_flush(cf) <- frees it! acquires i_ceph_lock <--- for-loop advances: cf = list_next_entry(cf, i_list) -- UAF on freed cf->i_list.next The cf was just sent by __kick_flushing_caps itself via __send_cap(). The MDS may respond with FLUSH_ACK quickly enough that handle_cap_flush_ack() frees cf before __kick_flushing_caps can finish the iteration. Fix by converting to a manual while loop: save the next pointer under i_ceph_lock before dropping it, then use the saved pointer after reacquiring, so the potentially-freed cf is never accessed again.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS