CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-89551

CriticalCVSS 9.8
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.17%

6th percentile - higher than 6% of all known CVEs

Summary

In the Linux kernel, xdr_buf_trim() does not clamp the subtraction from buf->len, so when buf->len is smaller than the sum of iov_lens, an underflow occurs and wraps to near UINT_MAX. This state is reachable via gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(), and the wrapped value propagates as the authoritative stream bound into all downstream XDR decoders.

Risk Assessment

This can lead to incorrect XDR data processing, potentially enabling remote code execution or information disclosure. However, it requires specially crafted GSS/Kerberos RPC packets.

Recommendation

Update the Linux kernel to a version containing the fix that clamps the decrement so buf->len bottoms out at zero. Check systems using NFS/RPC with Kerberos.

Other vulnerabilities in Linux kernel

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: xdr_buf_trim: clamp buf->len to avoid underflow xdr_buf_trim() trims `len` bytes from the tail of an xdr_buf by walking the tail, pages, and head iovecs. Each per-section step uses min_t() so it never removes more bytes than that section holds, but the final accounting at the fix_len label subtracts the total bytes actually consumed from buf->len without any clamp: fix_len: buf->len -= (len - trim); When the caller has set buf->len to a value smaller than the sum of the iov_lens, (len - trim) can exceed buf->len and the unsigned subtraction wraps to near UINT_MAX. gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() reaches xdr_buf_trim() in exactly that state: buf->head[0].iov_len -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; buf->len = len - (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip); xdr_buf_trim(buf, ec + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip); buf->len is a small wire-derived value while the iov_lens are at page scale, so the per-section loops legitimately consume far more bytes than buf->len records. The wrapped buf->len then propagates as the authoritative stream bound into every downstream XDR decoder. Fix by clamping the decrement so buf->len bottoms out at zero: buf->len -= min_t(unsigned int, buf->len, len - trim); On the normal path where the iov_lens sum to buf->len, (len - trim) is always <= buf->len and the result is identical to before. No callers change behavior outside the underflow case.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS