CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-89492

Unknown
Published: Translated: NVD NIST

Summary

A vulnerability was found in the Linux kernel's ocfs2 module due to missing validation of directory-index entry counts when reading metadata. The functions ocfs2_validate_dx_leaf() and ocfs2_validate_dx_root() do not bound the de_num_used and de_count fields against the block capacity, allowing a crafted on-disk image to set them to 0xffff and cause an out-of-bounds read past the 4KB metadata block. The flaw is reachable from any path lookup, stat() or open() on an indexed directory once the image is mounted.

Risk Assessment

The vulnerability allows an attacker with access to a crafted filesystem image to trigger a slab out-of-bounds read, potentially leading to kernel data disclosure or a system crash (denial of service). The risk is high in environments that mount untrusted ocfs2 images.

Recommendation

Update the Linux kernel to a version containing the fix that validates the de_count and de_num_used fields in ocfs2_validate_dx_leaf() and ocfs2_validate_dx_root(). Until patched, avoid mounting untrusted ocfs2 filesystem images.

Other vulnerabilities in Linux kernel (ocfs2)

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: validate directory-index entry counts when reading metadata ocfs2_validate_dx_leaf() and ocfs2_validate_dx_root() check the ECC and signature of an indexed-directory block before it reaches higher-level callers, but neither validator bounds the ocfs2_dx_entry_list counts against the capacity of the block that holds them. ocfs2_dx_dir_search() then walks for (i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(entry_list->de_num_used); i++) dx_entry = &entry_list->de_entries[i]; over de_num_used entries with no bounds check. entry_list is either dx_leaf->dl_list (from ocfs2_read_dx_leaf) or, for an inline root, dx_root->dr_entries. A crafted on-disk image can set de_num_used (and de_count, which is the __counted_by_le() bound of de_entries) to 0xffff and make the walk read far past the end of the 4KB metadata block, giving a slab out-of-bounds read reachable from any path lookup, stat() or open() on an indexed directory once the image is mounted. Commit 775c17386a6f ("ocfs2: validate dx_root extent list fields during block read") already bounds dr_list for the non-inline dx_root, but left the inline dr_entries path and the dx_leaf dl_list unchecked. Add the same read-time validation for both entry lists: de_count must equal the capacity of the block (ocfs2_dx_entries_per_leaf()/per_root()) and de_num_used must not exceed de_count, rejecting corrupted metadata with -EFSCORRUPTED before ocfs2_dx_dir_search() can walk an out-of-range entry array. de_count is always written as exactly the block capacity when a leaf or inline root is formatted, so the equality check does not reject any valid image. Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS