CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-88921

MediumCVSS 5.1
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Summary

MISP version ≤2.5.45 contains an HTML injection vulnerability in the MISPElementHTMLFormatterTool component, which renders MISP element references (attributes, objects, and tags) into inline HTML during PDF report export. User-controlled fields (attribute type and value, object name and relation, tag name and colours) are interpolated into HTML templates without HTML entity encoding. Additionally, the attribute() method contains hardcoded sample values ("domain-ip" and "google.com") instead of format placeholders, causing every plain attribute reference in a PDF to display the sample text rather than the actual indicator value.

Risk Assessment

An authenticated user with write access to MISP elements can embed arbitrary HTML markup, which when a report is exported to PDF may lead to script injection, breaking the document structure, or altering the visual content of the exported report. Depending on the HTML-to-PDF rendering engine, there is also a risk of executing injected markup during conversion, and the hardcoded sample values defect causes data-integrity loss in the exported document.

Recommendation

Update MISP to a version newer than 2.5.45, which includes the fix applying HTML entity encoding to all user-controlled fields and removing the hardcoded sample values from the template. Until patched, restrict write access to MISP elements to trusted users only and avoid exporting PDF reports from untrusted sources.

Other vulnerabilities in MISP

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

MISP contains an HTML injection vulnerability in the MISPElementHTMLFormatterTool component, which is responsible for rendering MISP element references (attributes, objects, and tags) into inline HTML during PDF report export via the convert_markdown_to_pdf module. The attribute(), objectAttribute(), object(), and tag() methods interpolated user-controlled fields (attribute type, attribute value, object name, object relation, tag name, tag colour, and tag text colour) directly into HTML templates without applying HTML entity encoding. An authenticated user with the ability to create or modify MISP attributes, objects, or tags could embed arbitrary HTML markup in these fields. When a report containing such elements was exported to PDF, the unescaped content was rendered as live HTML rather than inert text, potentially injecting script tags, breaking the document structure, or altering the visual content of the exported report. Additionally, the attribute() method contained a template with hardcoded sample values ("domain-ip" and "google.com") instead of format placeholders, meaning every plain attribute reference in a PDF displayed the sample text rather than the actual indicator value, constituting a data-integrity defect in the exported document. The vulnerability requires an authenticated actor with write access to MISP elements and a subsequent PDF export of a report referencing those elements. The security impact is primarily to the integrity of the exported document and, depending on the HTML-to-PDF rendering engine, potential execution of injected markup during the conversion step. Version affected: ≤2.5.45

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS