CVE-2026-87857
MediumCVSS 5.3Summary
Temporal Server does not bind a workflow-history pagination token to the namespace and workflow named in the request. An authenticated caller with read permission on one namespace can use a genuine continuation token from a second namespace to retrieve that second namespace's workflow history, provided the supplied workflow identifier selects the same History shard. Because the token is unauthenticated protobuf, the holder can also advance its event range and clear its persistence cursor, exposing events created after the caller's credentials no longer granted access.
Risk Assessment
Potential unauthorized access to workflow history from another namespace by an authenticated user holding a continuation token. This breaks namespace isolation and may disclose data the caller is no longer authorized to access.
Recommendation
Upgrade Temporal Server to a release that adds the binding check. Monitor History warning logs for the pagination branch token mismatch message and reason=foreign_branch, noting that metrics and logs are tagged with the requesting namespace, not the exposed namespace.
Other vulnerabilities in Temporal Server
See all- CVE-2026-120091High
Temporal Server includes a Worker Controller Instance module (go.temporal.io/auto-scaled-workers) that registers a 'k8s' compute provider which builds its Kubernetes client from the caller's request configuration rather than operator configuration. An authenticated caller with only read access in a single namespace can invoke ValidateWorkerDeploymentVersionComputeConfig, leading to arbitrary command execution on the Worker Service host under the server process account. Since the process holds persistence credentials for all namespaces and cluster TLS material, the impact extends beyond the caller's namespace to the entire cluster.
- CVE-2026-89140Medium
Temporal Server does not bind internal completion callbacks to the namespace that attached them, which allows an authenticated caller with write permission in one namespace to alter Scheduler V2 schedule state in another namespace. The callback address temporal://internal is reserved for callbacks that Scheduler V2 attaches to the Workflows it starts. In affected releases, any authenticated caller could attach a callback with that address to a Workflow start request, the address was exempt from the component.callbacks.allowedAddresses allowlist, and the History service delivered the callback to the component its token named, in whatever namespace that was, without authorizing the original caller there. When the forged completion matches an action a target schedule is running, the schedule records the action as completed while its Workflow still runs, which can defeat an overlap policy such as SKIP, and passes caller-controlled data to the next scheduled Workflow as its last completion result. A forged failure may also pause a schedule configured to pause on failure. A forgery requires the target namespace identifier, the schedule identifier, and the identity and timing of a running action. No disclosure of Workflow payloads or history was identified. Only namespaces that hold Scheduler V2 schedules can be targeted; Scheduler V2 is off by default, and existing Scheduler V2 schedules remain targets after the settings that create them are turned off.
- CVE-2026-104355High
A vulnerability in Temporal Server allows a connected peer cluster to modify local namespaces in the receiving cluster, which should not be replicated. The receiving cluster does not check if the namespace is global and overwrites its state, description, owner, retention, archival settings, cluster list, and active cluster if the task carries a higher failover version. An attacker controlling a registered peer's replies can change any local namespace without credentials on the receiving cluster, e.g., marking it Deprecated, causing new Workflow starts to fail.
- CVE-2026-89139High
Temporal Server vulnerability allows an authenticated user with write access to a single namespace to execute arbitrary commands on the host running the Worker Service. The command is executed immediately, and since the Worker Service process holds credentials and TLS material for the entire cluster, the impact escalates to full cluster compromise. Affected versions are 1.31.0 through 1.31.2 (before 1.31.3), and the issue is present in default binaries and container images.
- CVE-2026-87858High
Temporal Server in releases 1.30.0 and later decided whether a Workflow completion callback was internal by reading a caller-supplied HTTP header. An authenticated caller with write permission in a single namespace could attach a callback whose 'source' header caused the request to be re-targeted at the internal frontend and executed as a system administrator against the administrative API. Releases 1.25.0 through 1.29.7 are affected by a narrower form of the same defect requiring the header to match a configured cluster ID.
- CVE-2026-16652High
Temporal Server did not bound the work performed while searching for a Schedule's next action time. An authenticated caller with namespace write permission could create or update a Schedule combining a fine-grained cadence with an exclusion calendar that rejects every candidate time, causing excessive CPU consumption in Frontend and Schedule worker components.
- CVE-2026-5724Medium
The frontend gRPC server's streaming interceptor chain did not include the authorization interceptor. Configured ClaimMapper and Authorizer were bypassed for the AdminService/StreamWorkflowReplicationMessages endpoint, allowing unauthenticated access.
- CVE-2023-3485Low
Insecure defaults in open-source Temporal Server before version 1.20 on all platforms allow an attacker to craft a task token with access to a namespace other than the one specified in the request. This requires the namespace UUID and information from the workflow history for the target namespace.
Original NVD description (English source)
Temporal Server does not bind a workflow-history pagination token to the namespace and workflow named in the request that presents it. GetWorkflowExecutionHistory and GetWorkflowExecutionHistoryReverse authorize the caller against the namespace in the request, then select history from the branch recorded inside the caller-supplied next_page_token. The normal history continuation carries a run identifier, event bounds, a persistence cursor, and a branch token, but no namespace or workflow identity, and it is serialized as unauthenticated protobuf bytes. An authenticated caller holding read permission on one namespace, together with a genuine non-final continuation issued earlier for a workflow in a second namespace, can submit that continuation with a request naming the first namespace and receive the second namespace's workflow history, provided the supplied workflow identifier selects the same History shard as the continuation's branch. No workflow with the supplied identifier needs to exist. Because the token is unauthenticated, a holder can also advance its event range and clear its persistence cursor, which returns history events created after that caller's current credential no longer granted access to the continuation's namespace. Determining exposure is a version question rather than a configuration question: every release listed as affected omits the binding check on the forward history path, and on the reverse history path in releases from 1.16.0, which introduced GetWorkflowExecutionHistoryReverse; no setting in an affected release restores it, and affected releases emit no metric or log for the condition, so their telemetry provides no detection. Fixed releases add the check and, when a page token's branch token is not the requested execution's current branch token, record the counter pagination_token_branch_mismatch tagged with namespace and reason and write a History-service warning log reading "Pagination branch token is not the execution's current branch token" with the fields wf-namespace, wf-id, wf-run-id, reason, wf-branch-token, and wf-request-branch-token. Search History warning logs for that message, or for reason=foreign_branch, which denotes a branch token the requested execution never recorded and is not expected in normal operation; reason=non_current_branch denotes a retained but superseded branch of the same execution and can occur legitimately after conflict resolution or failover. A foreign_branch record does not by itself prove the read was refused, because the counter and log are emitted before the enforcement decision and therefore appear both when the check rejects the request and when history.enablePaginationTokenBranchValidationShadowMode is enabled and the read is served; confirm refusal from the gRPC response, which is InvalidArgument carrying a CurrentBranchChangedFailure detail. The metric and log are tagged with the requesting namespace, not the namespace whose history the token selects, so a foreign_branch alert does not name the exposed namespace. The issue does not provide unauthenticated access, construction of a usable continuation from public workflow identifiers, enumeration of workflows for which the caller holds no continuation, or any modification of workflow state.
Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS

